Abstract
In this article we attack several problems that arise when a group of individuals is organized in several teams with equal number of players in each one (e.g., for company work, in sports leagues, etc). We define a team game as a cooperative game v that can have non-zero values only on coalitions of a given cardinality; it is further shown that, for such games, there is essentially a unique ranking among the players. We also study the way the ranking changes after one or more players retire. Also, we characterize axiomatically different ways of ranking the players that intervene in a cooperative game.
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Hernández-Lamoneda, L., Sánchez-Sánchez, F. Rankings and values for team games. Int J Game Theory 39, 319–350 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0178-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0178-1