Abstract
Using an experimental auction, we explore how verifiable information affects the willingness to pay (WTP) for two climate friendly goods given the politicized climate change debate. We test whether the dissemination of (scientific) verifiable information lets subjects cut through the media noise. We define our baseline by first examining how noisy information (pro and con) about climate change affects WTP. We then consider how third party verifiable information within this noisy information affects WTP. Our results suggest subjects could cut through noisy information to process verifiable information. We find a significant WTP premium for climate protection. The verifiable information treatment increases the premium for both shade-grown coffee (by 51 %) and recycled paper (by 48 %). This suggests the WTP premium for climate change depends on the available information flow and the characteristics of the climate friendly good.





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Notes
Corbett and Durfee (2004) conduct an experiment and find that reader certainty about climate change is high when a story provides context, and they find that uncertainty is highest when controversy is present. Several papers document that willingness to pay (WTP) tends to be greater for environmentally friendlier products (Essoussi and Linton 2010), and numerous papers report that consumers reveal a positive WTP for environmental friendliness in food production (Baltzer 2003, Corsi and Novelli 2003). Similar results are found for non-food products (Laroche et al. 2001, Vlosky et al. 1999). The literature on how information affects WTP typically focuses on eco-labeling. Studies about eco-labeling indicate that consumers prefer environmentally friendly goods, and they report a significant WTP exists for a premium in environmental products (Diederich and Goeschl, 2014, Kotchen et al. 2013, Achtnicht 2012, Botzen and Van den Bergh, 2012, Loureiro et al. 2002, Johnston et al. 2001, Nimon and Beghin 1999). For instance, Loureiro et al. (2002) report an estimated premium for eco-labeled apples of around 5 %. Aguilar and Vlosky’s (2007) paper is on consumer WTP for price premiums for environmentally certified wood products in the United States, and they report a 10 % WTP premium for certified items. In a similar study, Blend and Van Ravenswaay (1999) report a higher WTP premium for eco-labeled apples—they find a 10 % WTP premium.
This auction mechanism is incentive compatible as each bidder has a weakly dominant strategy to submit a bid that is equal to their private value, and it aims to keep participants engaged in the auction. In a random nth-price auction, the k participants bid their maximum willingness to pay for an item. A monitor collects all bids in envelopes and records the bids in descending order. The monitor then randomly draws a number n from a discrete distribution from 2 to k, and the (n-1) highest bidders pay the nth price. For example, if n = 4 then the three highest bidders pay the fourth highest price.
The monitor determined the binding auction, a, by drawing a random number from 1 to 4. If the binding auction is a multiple good auction, the binding good, g, is determined by drawing a random number from 1 to 2. For example, if a = 3 and g = 2, the binding auction is the coffee auction (3rd auction) and the binding good is the shade coffee (2nd good offered in the coffee auction).
The coefficients are significant at 5 % with a regular variance-covariance matrix (p value = 0.012). We also checked the standards errors with bootstrapping (Mooney and Duval 1993, Cameron and Trivedi 2010), clustering by treatment group, and heteroscedasticity-consistent variances. In all trials, the coefficients are statistically significant at 5 %.
Rousu et al. (2007) consider two socio-demographic variables, gender and income, as the determinants of bidding behavior: they find these variables small in magnitude, although statistically significant. In our study, these demographics are not statistically significant. Including demographics and ordering effect do not change the results.
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Acknowledgments
We thank the Stroock (University of Wyoming) and the Rasmuson funds (University of Alaska-Anchorage) for the partial financial support. Thanks to Matt Rousu and the reviewers for helpful comments.
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Sapci, O., Wood, A.D., Shogren, J.F. et al. Can verifiable information cut through the noise about climate protection? An experimental auction test. Climatic Change 134, 87–99 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-015-1502-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-015-1502-3