Abstract
For an individual insurance firm offering supplementary private health insurance, a model is developed to decompose market performance in terms of insurer profits. For the individual contract, the model specifies the conditions under which adverse selection, cream skimming, and moral hazard occur, shows the impact of information on contracting, and the profit contribution. Contracts are determined by comparing willingness to pay for insurance with the individual’s risk position, and information on both sides of the market. Finally, performance is aggregated up to the total market. The model provides a framework to explain the attractiveness of supplementary markets to insurers.
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Leidl, R. A model to decompose the performance of supplementary private health insurance markets. Int J Health Care Finance Econ 8, 193–208 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10754-008-9037-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10754-008-9037-z