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Rational lobbying and EU climate policy

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Abstract

Using a simple rational choice model as a heuristic device, this paper explores the lobbying behaviour of environmental and business organisations in the field of climate policy and discusses why their lobbying behaviour differs. I find that environmental organisations lobby less than what would be considered rational according to the simple rational choice model, and argue that this might largely be explained by tight budget constraints. I also find that business organisations lobby more than what would be considered rational according to the model, and argue that this might be explained if one applies a long-term perspective on rational lobbying in the policy field rather than a short-term perspective on single policy decisions. Moreover, I find that the type of lobbying differs. While environmental organisations focus on single policy decisions, business organisations also invest in general lobbying. The analysis is based on interviews with interest organisations lobbying in the field of climate policy at the European Union (EU) level.

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Notes

  1. A “friend” is a decision-maker who shares the interest group’s view in the matter under consideration. A “foe” is a decision-maker who does not share the interest group’s view.

  2. CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6.

  3. Including the US, which has not ratified the Protocol.

  4. The 15 EU countries at the time the Kyoto Protocol was signed and ratified.

  5. The EU-15 had in 2005 reduced its emissions by 2% compared to base-year level. EEA concludes that ‘EU-15 is not on track to meet its Kyoto target, but that projections for 2010 indicate that the target will be met if Member States implement existing and additional measures fully and quickly, and make use of carbon sinks and Kyoto mechanisms’ (European Environmental Agency 2007, p. 6). However, there are large differences in targets between the member states.

  6. Business Europe from January 2007.

  7. While electricity producers benefit from the EU emissions trading system because they can pass through the costs to the consumers, the energy intensive industries oppose the existing emissions trading system—until it becomes a part of a global emissions trading system.

  8. Author’s interview with Peter Tjan, EUROPIA, Brussels, November 2005.

  9. The car industry apparently found it worth to lobby on this issue. The Commission’s proposal was postponed twice, commonly believed to be because of heavy lobbying from the German car industry. Finally, the Commission advocated an “integrated” strategy—which implied an objective of 130 grammes CO2 per kilometre by 2012 for the car industry and another 10 g/km reduction for other actors, such as tyre-makers, fuel suppliers, and drivers.

  10. Author’s interview with Nick Campbell, UNICE, Brussels, November 2005.

  11. See footnote 10.

  12. See footnote 10.

  13. This distinction corresponds with Kohler-Koch and Quittkat’s distinction between ‘regular contacts and background information’ and ‘targeted contacts and information’ (1999, p. 10).

  14. Author’s interview with Wim B. J. Philippa, ERT, Brussels, November 2005.

  15. See footnote 14.

  16. Author’s interview with Margot A. Loudon, Eurogas, Brussels, November 2005.

  17. See footnote 16.

  18. See footnote 8.

  19. See footnote 8.

  20. See footnote 8.

  21. Author’s interviews with Nick Campbell, Brussels, November 2005, Wim B. J. Philippa, ERT, Brussels, November 2005 and Peter Tjan, EUROPIA, Brussels, November 2005.

  22. Author’s interview with Mattias Duwe, CAN, Brussels, November 2005.

  23. See footnote 22.

  24. See footnote 22.

  25. See footnote 22.

  26. Author’s interview with Jeroen Verhoeven, Brussels, November 2006.

  27. See footnote 26.

  28. Author’s interview with Stephan Singer, WWF EPO, Brussels, November 2006.

  29. See footnote 28.

  30. See footnote 28.

  31. See footnote 28.

  32. Author’s interviews with Nick Campbell, UNICE, Brussels, November 2005, Wim B. J. Philippa, ERT, Brussels, November 2005 and Peter Tjan, EUROPIA, Brussels, November 2005.

  33. Author’s interviews with Dorette Corbey, MEP Socialist Group, Brussels, November 2006 and Pierre Schellekens, Cabinet of Stavros Dimas, DG Environment, Brussels, November 2006.

  34. Author’s interview with Pierre Schellekens, Cabinet of Stavros Dimas, DG Environment, Brussels, November 2006.

  35. Author’s interview with Claude Turmes, MEP Green Party, Brussels, November 2005.

  36. Author’s interviews with Mahi Sideridou, Greenpeace, Brussels, November 2005, Peter Tjan, EUROPIA, Brussels, November 2005, and Claude Turmes, MEP Green Party, Brussels, November 2005.

  37. See footnote 8.

  38. It is important to note that all motives for lobbying are strictly instrumental. One of the most common motives of non-instrumental lobbying is the interest group’s need to appear efficient in the eyes of its own members. Research on lobbying in the US finds that hearings in the Congress are an important arena for such non-instrumental lobbying (Holyoke 2003; Milbrath 1960). Lobbyists attend such hearings even though they know that the possibilities of influencing the decision-makers are limited—the latter have often made up their minds before the hearing. It is, however, ‘a useful way to the lobbyist to demonstrate to the membership that he is earning his salary’ (Milbrath 1960, p. 41).

  39. The group has become the Group of Ten, as another two organisations have joined the group.

  40. Author’s interviews with Mattias Duwe, CAN, Brussels, November 2005, Mahi Sideridou, Greenpeace, Brussels, November 2005, Stephan Singer, WWF EPO, Brussels, November 2006, and Jeroen Verhoeven, Brussels, November 2006.

  41. See footnote 22.

  42. Author’s interviews with Mattias Duwe, CAN, Brussels, November 2005, Mahi Sideridou, Greenpeace, Brussels, November 2005, and Jeroen Verhoeven, Brussels, November 2006.

  43. Author’s interview with Mattias Duwe, CAN, Brussels 2005.

  44. Author’s interviews with Nick Campbell, UNICE, Brussels, November 2005 and Wim B. J. Philippa, ERT, Brussels, November 2005.

  45. See footnote 10.

  46. See footnote 14.

  47. See footnote 10.

  48. See footnote 14.

  49. See Oliver (1993) for a review.

  50. Author’s interviews with Mattias Duwe, CAN, Brussels, November 2005 and Mahi Sideridou, Greenpeace, Brussels, November 2005.

Abbreviations

CANEurope:

Climate Action Network Europe

COP:

Conference of the Parties

DG:

Directorate-General

ECCP:

European Climate Change Programme

EP:

European Parliament

ERT:

European Roundtable of Industrialists

EU:

European Union

EU ETS:

European Emissions Trading System

Eurogas:

The European Union of Natural Gas Industry

EUROPIA:

The European Petroleum Industry Association

FoEE:

Friends of the Earth Europe

Greenpeace EU:

Greenpeace European Unit

MEP(s):

Member(s) of the European Parliament

UNFCCC:

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNICE:

Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe

WWF EPO:

WWF European Policy Office

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and Lynn P. Nygaard for comments and editorial assistance. Financial assistance by the Norwegian Research Council/SAMSTEMT/RENERGI is gratefully acknowledged.

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  1. CICERO, Pb 1129 Blindern, 0318, Oslo, Norway

    Anne Therese Gullberg

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Appendix: Interviews

Appendix: Interviews

  • Campbell, Dr. Nick, Leader of UNICE’s climate change working group, Union des Industries de la Communauté européenne (UNICE). Brussels, 22/11/2005.

  • Corbey, Dorette, Member of the European Parliament, the Socialist Group. Brussels, 21/11/2006.

  • Duwe, Mattias, Climate Action Network Europe. Brussels, 21/11/2005.

  • Lehtonen, Terhi, Advisor, European Parliament, Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance. Brussels, 24/11/2005.

  • Loudon, Margot A., Deputy Secretary General, Eurogas. Brussels, 21/11/2005.

  • Schellekens, Pierre, Cabinet of Stavros Dimas, DG Environment. Brussels, 22/11/2006.

  • Sideridou, Mahi, EU Policy Director on Climate Change and Energy, Greenpeace. Brussels, 22/11/2005.

  • Singer, Stephan, WWF European Policy Office. Brussels, 21/11/2006.

  • Tjan, Peter, Secretary General, EUROPIA. Brussels, 18/11/2005.

  • Turmes, Claude, Member of the European Parliament, Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance. Brussles, 22/11/2005.

  • Vergote, Stephan, Directorate-General Environment. Brussels, 23/11/2005.

  • Verhoeven, Jeroen, Assistant of the climate change campaign leader, Friends of the Earth Europe. Brussels, 20/11/2006.

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Gullberg, A.T. Rational lobbying and EU climate policy. Int Environ Agreements 8, 161–178 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-008-9067-5

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