Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Comment

  • Original Article
  • Published:
Public Choice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In an interesting recent paper, Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005) extended Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking game with an entry decision. The mixed strategies identified by Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi for the case of increasing returns in the contest success function (r2) do not constitute an equilibrium of the game they study. However, these strategies are an equilibrium if the strategy space of the game is restricted by a minimum expenditure requirement, and this minimum expenditure requirement is an element of a specific interval.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Aidt, T.S. (2002). Strategic political participation and redistribution. Economics and Politics, 14, 19–40.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baye, M.R., Kovenock, D., & de Vries, C.G. (1994). The solution to the Tullock rent-seeking game when R2: mixed strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates. Public Choice, 81, 363–380.

    Google Scholar 

  • Corcoran, W.J. (1984). Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking. Public Choice, 43, 89–94.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Corcoran, W.J., & Karels, G.V. (1985). Rent-seeking behavior in the long run. Public Choice, 46, 227–246.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dari-Mattiacci, G., & Parisi, F. (2005). Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: rethinking Tullock's paradox. Public Choice, 124, 411–422.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gradstein, M. (1995). Intensity of competition, entry and entry deterrence in rent seeking contests. Economics and Politics, 7, 79–91.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Higgins, R.S., Shughart, W.F., II, & Tollison, R.D. (1985). Free entry and efficient rent-seeking. Public Choice, 46, 247–258.

  • Hillman, A.L., & Samet, D. (1987). Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders. Public Choice, 54, 63–82.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lockard, A., & Tullock, G. (Eds.) (2000). Efficient rent-seeking: chronicle of an intellectual quagmire. Boston: Kluwer.

  • Schoonbeek, L., & Kooreman, P. (1997). Tullock's rent-seeking contest with a minimum expenditure requirement. Public Choice, 93, 477–486.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent-seeking. In: Buchanan, J.M., Tollison, G. & Tullock, G. (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society (pp. 97–112). College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

  • Yang, C.-L. (1993). Cooperation by credible threats: on the social costs of transfer contests under uncertainty. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149/3, 559–578.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yang, C.-L. (1994). A simple extension of the Dasgupta-Maskin existence theorem for discontinuous games with an application to the theory of rent-seeking. Economics Letters, 45, 181–183.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Free University of Berlin and Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), Reichpietschufer 50, 10785, Berlin, Germany

    Johannes Münster

Authors
  1. Johannes Münster
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Johannes Münster.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Münster, J. Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Comment. Public Choice 130, 329–335 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9088-y

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9088-y

Keywords

Search

Navigation