Abstract
When national leaders are replaced, the incoming leader often represents different interests to those of his predecessor. Such shifts in national priorities affect both the onset of WTO disputes and the resolution of ongoing disputes. In particular, leader turnover increases the likelihood that a nation will be involved in a WTO dispute as either plaintiff or defendant, and, if a dispute is ongoing, then leader change in a defendant state increases the likelihood of significant concessions by the defendant. The impact of leader change on both the initiation and settlement of disputes is greater in non-democratic states than democratic states.
Similar content being viewed by others
Explore related subjects
Discover the latest articles and news from researchers in related subjects, suggested using machine learning.Notes
The WTO provides details of procedures and the chronology and basis for each dispute (http://www.wto.org/index.htm).
Alternatively, we might have modeled this as a diminishing marginal return to protection.
We coded WTO membership by year of entry independent of when during the year a nation joined. China joined the WTO in 11th December 2001.
Rare event logit corrects for biases introduced by the small samples of ones compared to the large number of zeros. We used Stata’s implementation of rare event logit, which is available at (http://www.stanford.edu/~tomz/software/software.shtml accessed 2/20/2012).
Clarify provides estimates of substantive effects by drawing random samples of parameter values based on the estimated distribution and then simulating the dependent variable at given value for the independent variables.
These comparisons are again made assuming the economic variables are evaluated at the 95th percentile and year at 2000.
One partial explanation for this finding lies in the distribution of defendant regime types. As we have already seen, democratic defendants are more likely to make substantial concessions than autocratic ones, and democratic defendants are not evenly distributed across the cases. Of the 86 cases of non-democratic plaintiffs where leader change does not occur, the defendant is democratic in 55 % of the cases. In contrast, in the 55 cases where leader change occurs in a non-democratic plaintiff, the defendant is democratic in 76 % of the cases.
References
Ai, C., & Norton, E. C. (2003). Interaction terms in logit and probit model. Economic Letters, 80, 123–129.
Bello, J. H. (1996). The WTO dispute settlement understanding: less is more. American Journal of International Law, 90, 416–418.
Bennett, D. Scott, & Stam, A, (2000). EUGene: A conceptual manual. International Interactions, 26, 179–204. Website: http://eugenesoftware.org.
Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1981). The war trap. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Bueno De Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2012). Domestic explanations of international relations. Annual Review of Political Science, 15, 161–81.
Bueno De Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The logic of political survival. Cambridge: MIT.
Busch, M. L. (2000). Democracy, consultation, and the paneling of disputes under GATT. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44, 425–446.
Busch, M. L. (2007). Overlapping institutions, forum shopping, and dispute settlement in international trade. International Organization, 61(4), 735–761.
Busch, M. L., & Reinhardt, E. (2001). Bargaining in the shadow of the law: early settlement in GATT/WTO disputes. Fordham International Law Journal, 24(1), 158–172.
Busch, M. L., & Reinhardt, E. (2003). Developing countries and GATT/WTO dispute settlement. Journal of World Trade, 37(4), 719–35.
Busch, M. L., & Reinhardt, E. (2006). Three’s a crowd: third parties and WTO dispute settlement. World Politics, 58(3), 446–477.
Butler, M., & Hauser, H. (2000). The WTO dispute settlement system: a first assessment from an economic perspective. The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 16(2), 503–533.
Carroll, R., Leeds, B. A., & Mattes, M. (2012). Leadership turnover and foreign policy change: Societal interests, domestic institutions and voting in the United Nations. Working Paper, Rice University.
Clare, J. (2007). Domestic audiences and strategic interests. The Journal of Politics, 69(3), 732–745.
Conybeare, J. (1984). Politicians and protection: tariffs and elections in Australia. Public Choice, 43(2), 203–209.
Conybeare, J. (1991). Voting for protection: an electoral model of tariff policy. International Organization, 45(1), 57–81.
Davis, C. (2006). The politics of forum choice for trade disputes: Evidence from U.S. trade policy. Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelophia, September.
Davis, C. L., & Bermeo, S. B. (2009). Who files? Developing country participation in GATT/WTO adjudication. Journal of Politics, 71(3), 1033–1049.
Dreher, A., & Jensen, N. (2013). Country or leader? Political change and UN General Assembly voting. European Journal of Political Economy, 29, 183–196.
Flores, A. Q. (2012). A competing risks model of war termination and leader change. International Studies Quarterly. Forthcoming.
Fukunaga, Y. (2006). Securing compliance through the WTO dispute settlement system: implementation of DSB recommendations. Journal of International Economic Law, 9(2), 383–426.
Goemans, H.E., Gleditsch, K.S., & Chiozza, G. (2009). Introducing Archigos: A data set of political leaders. Journal of Peace Research 46, 2. Web. http://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/hgoemans/data.htm.
Goldstein, J., & Martin, L. L. (2000). Legalization, trade liberalization, and domestic politics: a cautionary note. International Organization, 54(Summer), 603–32.
Grossman, G., & Helpman, E. (2005). A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(483), 1239–1282.
Guisinger, A., & Smith, A. (2002). Honest threats: the interaction of reputation and political institutions in international crises. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(2), 175–200.
Guzman, A., & Simmons, B. A. (2002). To settle or empanel? An empirical analysis of litigation and settlement at the world trade organization. The Journal of Legal Studies, 16, 205–235.
Guzman, A., & Simmons, B. A. (2005). Power plays and capacity constraints: the selection of defendants in WTO disputes. The Journal of Legal Studies, 34(2), 557–598.
Hagan, J. D. (1989). Domestic political regime change and third world voting realignments in the United Nations, 1946–1984. International Organization, 43(3), 505–541.
Horn, H., Mavroidis, P.C., & Nordström, H. (1999). Is the use of the WTO dispute settlement system biased? CEPR Discussion Paper 2340.
Hudec, R. E. (1993). Enforcing international trade law: The evolution of the modern GATT legal system. Salem: Butterworth Legal.
Jones, B. F., & Olken, B. A. (2005). Do leaders matter? National leadership and growth since World War II. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(3), 835–864.
King, G., Tomz, M., & Wittenberg, J. (2000). Making the most of statistical analyses: improving interpretation and presentation. American Journal of Political Science, 44(2), 347–61.
Kunoy, B. (2007). Catch me if you can: an analysis of ‘measures taken to comply’ under the WTO dispute settlement understanding. Chinese Journal of International Law, 6(1), 43–66.
Leeds, B. A., Mattes, M., & Vogel, J. S. (2009). Interests, institutions, and the reliability of international commitments. American Journal of Political Science, 53(2), 461–476.
Leitner, K., & Lester, S. (2008). WTO dispute settlement 1995–2007–a statistical analysis. Journal of International Economic Law, 11(1), 179–92.
Lockhart, J., & Voon, T. (2005). Reviewing appellate review in the WTO dispute settlement system. Melbourne Journal of International Law, 6(2), 474–484.
Mansfield, E. D., & Busch, M. L. (1995). The Political Economy of Nontariff Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis. International Organization 49, 723–49.
Marshall, M. G., & Jaggers, K. (2002). Data User’s Manual. Polity IV Project. Available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htmi. Accessed 1 Sept 2004.
McGillivray, F. (1997). Party discipline as a determinant of the endogenous formation of tariffs. American Journal of Political Science, 41(2), 584–607.
McGillivray, F. (2003). Redistributive policies and stock price dispersion. British Journal of Political Science, 33(2), 367–396.
McGillivray, F. (2004). Privileging industry: The comparative politics of trade and industrial policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
McGillivray, F., & Smith, A. (1997). Institutional determinants of trade policy. International Interactions, 23(2), 119–143.
McGillivray, F., & Smith, A. (2004). The impact of leadership turnover on relations between states. International Organization, 58, 567–600.
McGillivray, F., & Smith, A. (2006). Credibility in compliance and punishment: leader specific punishments and credibility. Journal of Politics, 68(2), 248–258.
McGillivray, F., & Smith, A. (2008). Punishing the Prince. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
McGillivray, F., & Stam, A. C. (2004). Political institutions, coercive diplomacy, and the duration of economic sanctions. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(2), 154–172.
Persson, T., Roland, G., & Tabellini, G., (2003). How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions, and Economic Policies? NBER Working Papers 10176, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Poast, P. (2010). (Mis)Using dyadic data to analyze multilateral events. Political Analysis, 18, 403–425.
Reinhardt, E. (1999). Aggressive multilateralism: The determinants of GATT/WTO dispute initiation, 1948–1998. Unpublished Manuscript. Atlanta: Emory University.
Reinhardt, E. (2001). Adjudication without Enforcement in GATT Disputes. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(2), 174–195.
Rickard, S. J. (2010). Democratic differences: electoral institutions and compliance with GATT/WTO agreements. European Journal of International Relations, 16(4), 711–729.
Rogoveanu, C. H. (2010). Features of WTO dispute settlement. The standing of the EU. Romanian Journal of European Affairs, 10(3), 30–7.
Rosendorff, B. P. (2005). Stability and rigidity: politics and the design of the WTO’s dispute resolution procedure. American Political Science Review, 99(3), 389–400.
Russett, B. (1993). Grasping the democratic peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Tiernay, M. (2012). Why killing Kony May Lead to the Demise of the LRA: Examining the relationship between leadership change and civil war termination. Working Paper, Dept of Politics, New York University.
Tomz, M., King, G., & Zeng, L. (2003). ReLogit: rare events logistic regression. Journal of Statistical Software, 8(2).
Wolford, S. (2007). The turnover trap: new leaders, reputation, and international conflict. American Journal of Political Science, 51(4), 772–788.
World Bank (2012). World development indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators). Accessed September 5th 2012.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendix
Appendix
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Bobick, T., Smith, A. The impact of leader turnover on the onset and the resolution of WTO disputes. Rev Int Organ 8, 423–445 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-013-9171-3
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-013-9171-3