Publication: Direct method comparing efficient and non-efficient payoffs in differential games
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2003
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Springer
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Abstract
In this note, we present a method that allows us to decide when a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimum, without the explicit knowledge of the respective solutions. For that purpose, we establish a sufficient condition in terms of an algebraic inequality where the gradient of the value functions of the cooperative and noncooperative games as well as the state and control variables are involved.
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The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Keywords
Differential games, Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimum, Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations
Bibliographic citation
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications. 2003, vol. 119, nº 2, p. 395-405