Reflective luck and meta-epistemological scepticism
Abstract
In this thesis, I argue that a particular type of epistemic luck, called “reflective luck”,
motivates a meta-epistemological challenge to externalism about justification. I argue
that the meta-epistemological challenge consists in a substantive philosophical challenge
to externalism that entails the rejection of a naturalized epistemology. However, I
contend that the philosophical challenge to the externalist analysis of justification should
be tempered with an anti-sceptical intuition that we do have knowledge of putatively true
propositions. To this end, I argue that an externalist analysis of justification is best able
to accommodate our anti-sceptical intuitions; externalism, I argue, is the best way of
accommodating commonsense.
Although externalism is preserved and survives the meta-epistemological challenge, it is
not unscathed. Specifically, I contend that externalism deprives us of adequate
internalist epistemic grounds to think that we have externalistically justified beliefs. I
identify that in principle this is not a problem for externalism, because externalism can
respond in a number of ways (one way is to abandon the concept of justification as
essential to knowledge), but that nonetheless an adequate epistemology ought to do
justice to the legitimacy of the meta-epistemological challenge. However,
accommodating this legitimacy and preserving putative knowledge is not possible within
the traditional absolutist framework for doing epistemology. My conclusion is that
externalism is correct, but that the kind of externalist knowledge we have is not
especially fine-grained or perfect; this should put pressure on the absolutist framework
for doing epistemology.
Type
Thesis, MPhil Master of Philosophy
Rights
Embargo Reason: Embargo period has ended, thesis made available in accordance with University regulations.
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