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Stable Sets of a Strategic Public Good Provision Game
https://doi.org/10.15099/00002103
https://doi.org/10.15099/00002103c837938a-6593-4b3a-9deb-de75302f1958
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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290_Hirai_20140801.pdf (251.4 kB)
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Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2014-08-01 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Stable Sets of a Strategic Public Good Provision Game | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | strategic public good provision game | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | stable set | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | coalitional contingent threat situation | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | stable provision level | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
資源タイプ | technical report | |||||
ID登録 | ||||||
ID登録 | 10.15099/00002103 | |||||
ID登録タイプ | JaLC | |||||
著者 |
Hirai, Toshiyuki
× Hirai, Toshiyuki |
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著者別名 | ||||||
姓名 | 平井, 俊行 | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述 | We consider stable sets of a simple and symmetric strategicpublic good provision game.In particular, we consider stable sets where each one consists of strategy profiles that provide an identical level of the public good. We completely identify the public good provision levels to be supported by the stable sets for each number of players. This identification induces the following two observations. First, the efficient public good provision level is always supported by a stable set. Second, the public good provision levels at the stable sets are no lower than that at the (unique coalition-proof) Nash equilibrium. In fact, the stable sets support strictly higher public good provision levels than that at the Nash equilibrium if there are more than two players. Further, we give a welfare comparison between the stable sets and the Nash equilibrium by employing the coefficient of resource utilization. | |||||
引用 | ||||||
内容記述 | Working Paper, No.290, 2014.08, Faculty of economics, university of toyama | |||||
書誌情報 |
Working Paper, No.290, 2014.08.01, Faculty of economics, university of toyama 巻 290, p. 1-39, 発行日 2014-08-01 |
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フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
著者版フラグ | ||||||
出版タイプ | AM | |||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | Faculty of economics, university of toyama | |||||
資源タイプ(DSpace) | ||||||
内容記述 | Working Paper | |||||
シリーズ | ||||||
関連名称 | Working Paper / No.290; |