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Título: | Optimal crowdfunding design |
Autor: | Ellman, Matthew CSIC ORCID ; Hurkens, Sjaak CSIC ORCID | Palabras clave: | Crowdfunding Mechanism design Entrepreneurial nance Market-testing Adaptation Rent-extraction |
Fecha de publicación: | ene-2016 | Editor: | Barcelona Graduate School of Economics | Citación: | Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series (871): (2016) | Resumen: | We characterize optimal reward-based crowdfunding where production is contingent on an aggregate funding threshold. Crowdfunding adapts project implementation to demand (market-testing) and its multiple prices enhance rent-extraction via pivotality, even for large crowds, indeed arbitrarily large if tastes are correlated. Adaptation raises welfare. Rent-extraction can enhance adaptation, but sometimes distorts production and lowers welfare. Threshold commitment, central to AllOr-Nothing platforms, raises profits but can lower consumer welfare. Platforms sometimes promote not-for-profits to raise success rates. When new buyers arrive ex-post, crowdfunding's market-test complements traditional nance and optimizes subsequent pricing. Crowdfunding is a general optimal mechanism in our baseline. | Descripción: | First draft: October 2014
This version: October 2016 Trabajo presentado en el EEA-ESEM: (31 Annual Congress of the European Economic Association & 69th European Meeting of the Econometric Society) celebrado en Genova del 22 al 26 de agosto de 2016.--Trabajo presentado en los Research Seminars de la Universidad de Bologna celebrado el 8 de marzo de 2016 |
Versión del editor: | https://www.barcelonagse.eu/research/working-papers/optimal-crowdfunding-design | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/175436 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo |
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871_Ellman.pdf | 795,18 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
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