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Título

Optimal crowdfunding design

AutorEllman, Matthew CSIC ORCID ; Hurkens, Sjaak CSIC ORCID
Palabras claveCrowdfunding
Mechanism design
Entrepreneurial nance
Market-testing
Adaptation
Rent-extraction
Fecha de publicaciónene-2016
EditorBarcelona Graduate School of Economics
CitaciónBarcelona GSE Working Paper Series (871): (2016)
ResumenWe characterize optimal reward-based crowdfunding where production is contingent on an aggregate funding threshold. Crowdfunding adapts project implementation to demand (market-testing) and its multiple prices enhance rent-extraction via pivotality, even for large crowds, indeed arbitrarily large if tastes are correlated. Adaptation raises welfare. Rent-extraction can enhance adaptation, but sometimes distorts production and lowers welfare. Threshold commitment, central to AllOr-Nothing platforms, raises profits but can lower consumer welfare. Platforms sometimes promote not-for-profits to raise success rates. When new buyers arrive ex-post, crowdfunding's market-test complements traditional nance and optimizes subsequent pricing. Crowdfunding is a general optimal mechanism in our baseline.
DescripciónFirst draft: October 2014 This version: October 2016
Trabajo presentado en el EEA-ESEM: (31 Annual Congress of the European Economic Association & 69th European Meeting of the Econometric Society) celebrado en Genova del 22 al 26 de agosto de 2016.--Trabajo presentado en los Research Seminars de la Universidad de Bologna celebrado el 8 de marzo de 2016
Versión del editorhttps://www.barcelonagse.eu/research/working-papers/optimal-crowdfunding-design
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/175436
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo




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