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Título: | Chores |
Autor: | LaCasse, Chantale; Ponsatí, Clara CSIC ; Barham, Vicky | Fecha de publicación: | 2002 | Editor: | Elsevier | Citación: | Games and Economic Behavior 39(2): 237-281 (2002) | Resumen: | We analyze situations where the provision of each of c public goods must be voluntarily assumed by exactly one of n private agents in the absence of transfer schemes or binding contracts. We model this problem as a complete information, potentially infinite horizon game where n agents simultaneously wage c wars of attrition. Providing a public good commits an agent not to take on the provision of another public good for a fixed period. We explore the strategic trade-offs that this commitment ability and the multiplicity of tasks provide. Subgame perfect equilibria (SPEs) are characterized completely for games with two agents and two public goods. For games with two identical agents and c > 1 identical public goods, we establish that an equilibrium that yields a surplus-maximizing outcome always exists and we provide sufficient conditions under which it is the unique equilibrium outcome. We show that under mild conditions, the surplus-maximizing SPE is the unique symmetric SPE. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: H41, C72, D13. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/57474 | DOI: | 10.1006/game.2001.0899 | Identificadores: | doi: 10.1006/game.2001.0899 issn: 0899-8256 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Artículos |
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