The carrot and the stick: Bank bailouts and the disciplining role of board appointments

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/235547

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Title:

The document was removed on behalf of the author(s)/ the editor(s).

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Year of Publication:

2021

Series/Report no.:

SAFE Working Paper No. 316

Publisher:

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, Frankfurt a. M.

Subjects:

Bank Bailout
TARP
Capital Purchase Program
Dividend Payments
Board Appointments
Bank Recapitalization

JEL:

G01
G2
G28
G38
H81

Persistent Identifier of the first edition:

Document Type:

Working Paper

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The document was removed on behalf of the author(s)/ the editor(s) on: October 18, 2021