Il conflitto di attribuzione tra poteri dello Stato come strumento di verifica della regolarità del procedimento legislativo e l’invalicabile soglia del controllo di ammissibilità

The paper deals with two conflicts of constitutional powers on the enforcement of Italian constitutional norms on the legislative process. In particular, with orders nn. 17/2019 and 60/2020, the Constitutional Court judged on the admissibility of two constitutional conflicts between powers of the State, promoted by some Members of the Italian Parliament (and Parliamentary Groups) against the Majority of MP's which approved the National Budget Law. The most peculiar aspects of the two cases concerned the very nature of the controversy; the powers of the Constitutional Court under art. 134 c. 2 Cost.; the institutional context in which these conflicts arose. To be more clear, in the two specific constitutional conflicts it is given that organs of Parliament are challenging the validity of Legislative Acts of the very same organ to which they belong (the Parliament) assuming their invalidity on a formal point of view; moreover, the Constitutional Court is then asked to rule on the admissibility of this kind of constitutional conflict without any kind of guarantees of “adversarial principle”; finaly, the institutional context in which these conflicts are arising is characterized by an evident failure of the bicameral principle (the political regime seems to incline towards a “de facto” monocameralism). The contribution tries to outline possible solutions on a normative side, backing an evolution of the Constitutional Court case law on the admissibility of Constitutional conflicts between powers of the State towards an increasingly incisive role of admissibility phase of the conflicts, as a tool for an immediate protection within the system of constitutional guarantees.