Exploring the dilemma of overcapacity governance in China's coal industry: A tripartite evolutionary game model

Wang, Y; Wang, D; Shi, X

Exploring the dilemma of overcapacity governance in China's coal industry: A tripartite evolutionary game model

Wang, Y Wang, D Shi, X

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Publisher:: ELSEVIER SCI LTD
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Resources Policy, 2021, 71
Issue Date:: 2021-06-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Wang, Y
dc.contributor.author	Wang, D
dc.contributor.author	Shi, X https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9653-7395
dc.date.accessioned	2021-11-21T23:59:24Z
dc.date.available	2021-11-21T23:59:24Z
dc.date.issued	2021-06-01
dc.identifier.citation	Resources Policy, 2021, 71
dc.identifier.issn	0301-4207
dc.identifier.issn	1873-7641
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/151770
dc.description.abstract	Coal overcapacity reduction is an essential part of China's energy transition. An effective governance model is a key to realizing the smooth exit of excess coal capacity. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the central government (CG), local governments (LGs) and coal enterprises (CEs), and then use it to examine the dilemma of overcapacity governance and alternative policies. Our results demonstrate that: First, the evolutionary convergence of strategy among the tripartite game agents exhibits a reliable degree of interdependence. The market-oriented central regulation mechanism of the CG may incentivize LGs to take a strict implementation. Also, when the LGs strictly perform the de-capacity policy, CEs are more active in responding to the de-capacity task. Second, the stable and ideal evolutionary state of (0,1,1) can be achieved when the corresponding conditions are met, which indicates that the coal de-capacity should coordinate the interests of multiple stakeholders. Third, inspired by the parameters sensitivity simulation, reducing the de-capacity costs, a balanced performance appraisal system, an appropriate supervision and punishment mechanism for de-capacity implementation, and increasing the investment in technological innovation and upgrading can promote the effective management of the coal overcapacity issue. This study can more genuinely reflect the complicated dynamic game process of China's coal de-capacity than the previous studies, and thus provides insights and decision-making references for the design of an effective coal overcapacity governance mode.
dc.language	English
dc.publisher	ELSEVIER SCI LTD
dc.relation	National Natural Science Foundation of China71828401
dc.relation.ispartof	Resources Policy
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.resourpol.2021.102000
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject	0914 Resources Engineering and Extractive Metallurgy, 1605 Policy and Administration
dc.subject.classification	Environmental Sciences
dc.title	Exploring the dilemma of overcapacity governance in China's coal industry: A tripartite evolutionary game model
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	71
utslib.for	0914 Resources Engineering and Extractive Metallurgy
utslib.for	1605 Policy and Administration
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/DVC (International)
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/DVC (International)/Australia-China Relations Institute
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
dc.date.updated	2021-11-21T23:59:22Z
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	71

Abstract:

Coal overcapacity reduction is an essential part of China's energy transition. An effective governance model is a key to realizing the smooth exit of excess coal capacity. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the central government (CG), local governments (LGs) and coal enterprises (CEs), and then use it to examine the dilemma of overcapacity governance and alternative policies. Our results demonstrate that: First, the evolutionary convergence of strategy among the tripartite game agents exhibits a reliable degree of interdependence. The market-oriented central regulation mechanism of the CG may incentivize LGs to take a strict implementation. Also, when the LGs strictly perform the de-capacity policy, CEs are more active in responding to the de-capacity task. Second, the stable and ideal evolutionary state of (0,1,1) can be achieved when the corresponding conditions are met, which indicates that the coal de-capacity should coordinate the interests of multiple stakeholders. Third, inspired by the parameters sensitivity simulation, reducing the de-capacity costs, a balanced performance appraisal system, an appropriate supervision and punishment mechanism for de-capacity implementation, and increasing the investment in technological innovation and upgrading can promote the effective management of the coal overcapacity issue. This study can more genuinely reflect the complicated dynamic game process of China's coal de-capacity than the previous studies, and thus provides insights and decision-making references for the design of an effective coal overcapacity governance mode.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/151770