Driving a hard bargain is a balancing act: how social preferences constrain the negotiation process

Engler, Y; Page, L

Driving a hard bargain is a balancing act: how social preferences constrain the negotiation process

Engler, Y Page, L

Permalink

Publisher:: Springer
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Theory and Decision: an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision sciences, 2022
Issue Date:: 2022-08-02

Closed Access

	Filename	Description	Size
	TD21[7].pdf	Accepted version	1.2 MB	Adobe PDF	View/Open

Copyright Clearance Process

Recently Added
In Progress
Closed Access

This item is closed access and not available.

Full metadata record

Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Engler, Y
dc.contributor.author	Page, L https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6020-9733
dc.date.accessioned	2022-03-31T12:05:24Z
dc.date.available	2022-03-31T12:05:24Z
dc.date.issued	2022-08-02
dc.identifier.citation	Theory and Decision: an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision sciences, 2022
dc.identifier.issn	0040-5833
dc.identifier.issn	1573-7187
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/155800
dc.description.abstract	We investigate the haggling process in bargaining. Using an experimental bargaining game, we find that a first offer has a significant impact on the bargaining outcome even if it is costless to reject. First offers convey information on the player’s reservation value induced by his social preferences. They are most often accepted when they are not above the equal split. However, offers which request much more than the equal split induce punishing counter-offers. The bargaining outcome is therefore critically influenced by the balance of toughness and kindness signalled through the offers made in the haggling phase.
dc.language	English
dc.publisher	Springer
dc.relation.ispartof	Theory and Decision: an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision sciences
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1007/s11238-021-09835-y
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject	14 Economics, 17 Psychology and Cognitive Sciences, 22 Philosophy and Religious Studies
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory
dc.title	Driving a hard bargain is a balancing act: how social preferences constrain the negotiation process
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.for	14 Economics
utslib.for	17 Psychology and Cognitive Sciences
utslib.for	22 Philosophy and Religious Studies
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
pubs.consider-herdc	false
dc.date.updated	2022-03-31T12:05:23Z
pubs.publication-status	Published

Abstract:

We investigate the haggling process in bargaining. Using an experimental bargaining game, we find that a first offer has a significant impact on the bargaining outcome even if it is costless to reject. First offers convey information on the player’s reservation value induced by his social preferences. They are most often accepted when they are not above the equal split. However, offers which request much more than the equal split induce punishing counter-offers. The bargaining outcome is therefore critically influenced by the balance of toughness and kindness signalled through the offers made in the haggling phase.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/155800