Directives, expressives, and motivation

Suzuki, T

Directives, expressives, and motivation

Suzuki, T

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Theoretical Economics, 2017, 12 (1), pp. 175 - 210
Issue Date:: 2017-01-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Suzuki, T https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1804-7416	en_US
dc.date.issued	2017-01-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Theoretical Economics, 2017, 12 (1), pp. 175 - 210	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1933-6837	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/60812
dc.description.abstract	Copyright © 2017 The Author. When an agent's motivation is sensitive to how his supervisor thinks about the agent's competence, the supervisor has to take into account both informational and expressive contents of her message to the agent. This paper shows that the supervisor can credibly express her trust in the agent's ability only by being unclear about what to do. Suggesting what to do, i.e., “directives,” could reveal the supervisor's “distrust” and reduce the agent's equilibrium effort level even though it provides useful information about the decision environment. There is also an equilibrium in which directives are neutral in expressive content. However, it is shown that neologism proofness favors equilibria in which directives are double-edged swords.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Theoretical Economics	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.3982/TE1843	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory	en_US
dc.title	Directives, expressives, and motivation	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	1	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	12	en_US
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access
pubs.issue	1	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	12	en_US

Abstract:

Copyright © 2017 The Author. When an agent's motivation is sensitive to how his supervisor thinks about the agent's competence, the supervisor has to take into account both informational and expressive contents of her message to the agent. This paper shows that the supervisor can credibly express her trust in the agent's ability only by being unclear about what to do. Suggesting what to do, i.e., “directives,” could reveal the supervisor's “distrust” and reduce the agent's equilibrium effort level even though it provides useful information about the decision environment. There is also an equilibrium in which directives are neutral in expressive content. However, it is shown that neologism proofness favors equilibria in which directives are double-edged swords.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/60812