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PDF
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Type:
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Journal Article |
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Author:
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Araral, Eduardo K. |
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Journal:
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Environmental Science and Policy |
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Volume:
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25 |
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Page(s):
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147-156 |
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Date:
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2013 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/8614
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Sector:
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General & Multiple Resources
History
Water Resource & Irrigation |
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Region:
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Middle East & South Asia |
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Subject(s):
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adaptation
collective action
irrigation
transaction costs
commons
water management
Coase theorem
Ostrom, Elinor
Williamson, Oliver
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Abstract:
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"I argue in this paper that transaction cost is central to the analytics of climate adaptation in the local commons. I illustrate this by bringing together insights from Coase on tradability of property rights, Ostrom on institutional design principles for long lived commons and Williamson on transaction cost and governance mechanisms. I call this the COW model on the analytics of climate adaptation, which I illustrate using grounded theory in the case of the 400-year old zangjera irrigation societies in Northern Philippines. The zangjeras are highly vulnerable to climatic risks but has successfully managed to adapt steadily overtime. I argue that their ability to adapt is a function of transaction cost which is associated with some ingenious principles of institutional design such as: (1) clear allocation and tradability of rights and obligations; (2) fairness in the allocation of risks, costs and benefits; (3) reliance on prices and incentives as adaptation mechanisms; (4) adaptive efficiency, i.e. maximization of welfare at least adaptation cost; (5) reliable enforcement mechanisms; and (6) a polycentric structure of governance. I conclude that the COW model can provide a useful foundation for the analytics of climate adaptation."
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