Abstract
Recent cases of non-compliance with judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) raise several profound questions of legitimacy. Some states seem simply unwilling to defer to the ECtHR, putting their own legitimacy on the line. Other cases, such as the Hirst v. UK case of prisoners' voting rights, seem to challenge the legitimacy of the Court or aspects of its practices. 2 May some such non-compliance with international courts in fact be justifiable? The present chapter argues that some forms of parliamentary disobedience may be understood and assessed not only as protest and avoidance, but also as a constructive mode of correcting the law making of the ECtHR. Under some conditions, certain forms of domestic parliamentary disobedience should be considered as and accepted as an extreme form of multi-level law making. [...]
This material has been published in The International Human Rights Judiciary and National Parliaments: Europe and Beyond, edited by M. Saul, A. Follesdal and G. Ulfstein. This version is free to view and download for personal use only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © 2017 Cambridge University Press