Download

Full Text

• Fujioka, A., Okamoto, T., Ohta, K.: A practical secret voting scheme for large scale elections. In: Seberry, J., Zheng, Y. (eds.) AUSCRYPT 1992. LNCS, vol. 718, pp. 244–251. Springer, Heidelberg (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-57220-1 66
• Adida, B.: Helios: web-based open-audit voting. In: Proceedings of the 17th Conference on Security Symposium. SS 2008, pp. 335–348. USENIX Association (2008)
• Ryan, P.Y.A., Rønne, P.B., Iovino, V.: Selene: voting with transparent verifiability and coercion-mitigation. In: Clark, J., Meiklejohn, S., Ryan, P.Y.A., Wallach, D., Brenner, M., Rohloff, K. (eds.) FC 2016. LNCS, vol. 9604, pp. 176–192. Springer, Heidelberg (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53357-4 12
• Kremer, S., Ryan, M.: Analysis of an electronic voting protocol in the applied pi calculus. In: Sagiv, M. (ed.) ESOP 2005. LNCS, vol. 3444, pp. 186–200. Springer, Heidelberg (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-31987-0 14
• Abadi, M., Blanchet, B., Fournet, C.: The applied pi calculus: mobile values, new names, and secure communication. J. ACM 65, 1–41 (2017)
• Delaune, S., Ryan, M., Smyth, B.: Automatic verification of privacy properties in the applied pi calculus. In: Karabulut, Y., Mitchell, J., Herrmann, P., Jensen, C.D. (eds.) IFIPTM 2008. ITIFIP, vol. 263, pp. 263–278. Springer, Boston, MA (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-09428-1 17
• Chadha, R., Cheval, V., Ciobâcă, Ş., Kremer, S.: Automated verification of equivalence properties of cryptographic protocols. ACM Trans. Comput. Log. 17, 1–32 (2016)
• Bana, G., Comon-Lundh, H.: A computationally complete symbolic attacker for equivalence properties. In: ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 609–620 (2014)
• Bana, G., Comon-Lundh, H.: Towards unconditional soundness: computationally complete symbolic attacker. In: Degano, P., Guttman, J.D. (eds.) POST 2012. LNCS, vol. 7215, pp. 189–208. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). https://doi.org/10. 1007/978-3-642-28641-4 11
• Bana, G., Adão, P., Sakurada, H.: Computationally complete symbolic attacker in action. In: Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science, pp. 546–560 (2012)
• Bana, G., Adão, P., Sakurada, H.: Symbolic Verification of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Protocol (2012). http://web.ist.utl.pt/pedro.adao/pubs/drafts/nsl-long.pdf
• Bana, G., Chadha, R.: Verification methods for the computationally complete symbolic attacker based on indistinguishability. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/069 (2016). http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/069
• Comon, H., Koutsos, A.: Formal computational unlinkability proofs of RFID protocols. In: IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, pp. 100–114 (2017)
• Scerri, G., Stanley-Oakes, R.: Analysis of key wrapping APIs: generic policies, computational security. In: IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, pp. 281–295 (2016)
• Chaum, D.L.: Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms. Commun. ACM 24, 84–90 (1981)
• Benaloh, J., Tuinstra, D.: Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract). In: ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 544–553 (1994)
• Benaloh, J.D.C.: Verifiable Secret-ballot Elections. Ph.D. thesis, Yale University (1987)
• Juels, A., Luby, M., Ostrovsky, R.: Security of blind digital signatures. In: Kaliski, B.S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1997. LNCS, vol. 1294, pp. 150–164. Springer, Heidelberg (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0052233
• Smyth, B., Bernhard, D.: Ballot secrecy and ballot independence coincide. In: Crampton, J., Jajodia, S., Mayes, K. (eds.) ESORICS 2013. LNCS, vol. 8134, pp. 463–480. Springer, Heidelberg (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40203-6 26
• Bernhard, D., Cortier, V., Galindo, D., Pereira, O., Warinschi, B.: Sok: a comprehensive analysis of game-based ballot privacy definitions. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 499–516 (2015)
• Cortier, V., Dragan, C.C., Dupressoir, F., Schmidt, B., Strub, P., Warinschi, B.: Machine-checked proofs of privacy for electronic voting protocols. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 993–1008 (2017)
• Fischlin, M., Schröder, D.: Security of blind signatures under aborts. In: Jarecki, S., Tsudik, G. (eds.) PKC 2009. LNCS, vol. 5443, pp. 297–316. Springer, Heidelberg (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00468-1 17
• Chaum, D.: Blind signatures for untraceable payments. In: Chaum, D., Rivest, R.L., Sherman, A.T. (eds.) Advances in Cryptology, pp. 199–203. Springer, Boston, MA (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-0602-4 18
• Abdalla, M., Namprempre, C., Neven, G.: On the (im)possibility of blind message authentication codes. In: Pointcheval, D. (ed.) CT-RSA 2006. LNCS, vol. 3860, pp. 262–279. Springer, Heidelberg (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/11605805 17
• Smart, N.P.: Cryptography Made Simple. Information Security and Cryptography. Springer, Cham (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21936-3
• Damgård, I.B., Pedersen, T.P., Pfitzmann, B.: On the existence of statistically hiding bit commitment schemes and fail-stop signatures. J. Cryptol. 10, 163–194 (1997)
• Naor, M.: Bit commitment using pseudorandomness. J. Cryptol. 4, 151–158 (1991)
• Bana, G., Chadha, R., Eeralla, A.K.: Formal analysis of vote privacy using computationally complete symbolic attacker. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2018/624 (2018). https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/624