Judgmental Force and Assertion in Brentano and Early Husserl

0454260 - FLÚ 2016 RIV RO eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Janoušek, Hynek
Judgmental Force and Assertion in Brentano and Early Husserl.
Studia Phaenomenologica. -, č. 15 (2015), s. 107-128. ISSN 1582-5647
Grant CEP: GA ČR GA15-18149S
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985955
Klíčová slova: Brentano * Husserl * judgment * assertion * judgmental force * phenomenology
Kód oboru RIV: AA - Filosofie a náboženství

The goal of the article is to describe the Brentanian background of several topics concerning judgments and assertions in Husserl's Logical Investigations. Why did Husserl abandon Brentano's theory of two judgmental forces? Is the 'is true/false' to be understood as an expression of judgmental force or as a logical predication? Is a 'common expression' of/nthe objective validity of judgment equivalent with our expression of our belief in that validity? In order to provide a better understanding of Husserl's approach, the paper also discusses his earlier views on these issues in recently published manuscripts from the early 1890s and in his Logic Lectures from the year 1896./n
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0254989