How Rescher Failed to Fill the Fact/Value Gap

0504327 - FLÚ 2020 RIV CZ eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Kolář, P. - Svoboda, Vladimír
How Rescher Failed to Fill the Fact/Value Gap.
Filosofie dnes. Roč. 10, č. 1 (2018), s. 4-30. ISSN 1804-0969
Grant CEP: GA ČR(CZ) GA17-15645S
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985955
Klíčová slova: metaethics * Hume’s thesis * hybrid statements * dichotomy assumption
Obor OECD: Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Způsob publikování: Open access
https://filosofiednes.ff.uhk.cz/index.php/hen/article/view/250

In his (several times reprinted) article How Wide Is the Gap Between Facts and Values? N. Rescher aspires to clarify the long-lasting discussion on the ‘is-ought’ (‘fact-value’) gap by providing a framework in which the related arguments can be perspicuously articulated. He then argues that even if the logical gap may be real, the transition from factual premises to value conclusions is smoothly mediated by trivially true value statements. We scrutinize Rescher’s argumentation and show defects in the presented lines of reasoning. In particular, we argue that his tripartite division of statements (factual, evaluative, hybrid), as well as his emphasis on the role of evaluative truisms, introduce serious problems that escape Rescher’s attention. We thus conclude that he failed to achieve his goals.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0295988