Il virtuoso deve amarsi. I profili della philautìa in Aristotele

This paper tries to explore the notion of philautìa in Aristotle, which is “elusive” by virtue of its constitutive polyvocality, as it is crucial, not only within the Aristotelian reflection but also inside of the cultural horizon that precedes it. Entering deeper into this figure, we could say that philautìa is, at the same time, simple and extreme: 1) “simple” because the Aristotelian discourse explicitly unfolds around only two “profiles” or “scenarios” (as will be seen in the following part); 2) “extreme” because these profiles are opposed. In summary, we can say that we are faced with two senses of the term philautìa: 1) a negative one, brought into play above all by ordinary discourse, according to which the phìlautos is an “egoist”, a vicious and an opportunist, and as such should be blamed; 2) a positive one, according to which the phìlautos is the one who, rightly, loves himself and takes care of the best part of his soul.