We consider duality relations between risk-sensitive stochastic control problems and dynamic games. They are derived from two basic duality results, the first involving free energy and relative entropy and resulting from a Legendre-type transformation, the second involving power functions. Our approach allows us to treat, in essentially the same way, continuous- and discrete-time problems, with complete and partial state observation, and leads to a very natural formal justification of the structure of the cost functional of the dual. It also allows us to obtain the solution of a stochastic game problem by solving a risk-sensitive control problem.

Connections between stochastic control and dynamic games

Paolo dai Pra;
1996-01-01

Abstract

We consider duality relations between risk-sensitive stochastic control problems and dynamic games. They are derived from two basic duality results, the first involving free energy and relative entropy and resulting from a Legendre-type transformation, the second involving power functions. Our approach allows us to treat, in essentially the same way, continuous- and discrete-time problems, with complete and partial state observation, and leads to a very natural formal justification of the structure of the cost functional of the dual. It also allows us to obtain the solution of a stochastic game problem by solving a risk-sensitive control problem.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11562/1009568
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