Is optimal monetary policy always optimal?

Date
2015
Authors
Daviga, T.
Gürkaynak, R. S.
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Source Title
International Journal of Central Banking
Print ISSN
1815-4654
Electronic ISSN
1815-7556
Publisher
Federal Reserve Board
Volume
11
Issue
Pages
353 - 384
Language
English
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Abstract

No. And not only for the reason you think. In a world with multiple ine - ciencies the single policy tool the central bank has control over will not undo all ine ciencies; this is well understood. We argue that the world is better characterized by multiple ine ciencies and multiple policy makers with various objectives. Asking the policy question only in terms of optimal monetary policy e ectively turns the central bank into the residual claimant of all policy and gives the other policymakers a free hand in pursuing their own goals. This further worsens the tradeo s faced by the central bank. The optimal monetary policy literature and the optimal simple rules often labeled exible in ation targeting assign all of the cyclical policymaking duties to central banks. This distorts the policy discussion and narrows the policy choices to a suboptimal set. We highlight this issue and call for a broader thinking of optimal policies.

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