The Tractatus rejects the sign of assertion as “logically meaningless”, but the rejection of the sign did not lead Wittgenstein to reject the corresponding notion. I show the presence and the importance in the early Wittgenstein of a notion keenly similar to Fregean and Russellian logical assertion. I propose to call this notion “affirmation.” The preparatory writings and the TLP 1 present different theories about affirmation. The correct understanding of the nature and purpose of affirmation proves critical in order to confront another issue about the Tractatus: the only partial similarity between the theory of pictures and the theory of propositions.

Assertion and Affirmation in the Early Wittgenstein

LANDO, Giorgio
2011-01-01

Abstract

The Tractatus rejects the sign of assertion as “logically meaningless”, but the rejection of the sign did not lead Wittgenstein to reject the corresponding notion. I show the presence and the importance in the early Wittgenstein of a notion keenly similar to Fregean and Russellian logical assertion. I propose to call this notion “affirmation.” The preparatory writings and the TLP 1 present different theories about affirmation. The correct understanding of the nature and purpose of affirmation proves critical in order to confront another issue about the Tractatus: the only partial similarity between the theory of pictures and the theory of propositions.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11697/108121
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