A Complete Characterization of Group-strategyproof Mechanisms of Cost-sharing

Pountourakis, Emmanouil; Vidali, Angelina

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-15775-2_13

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A Complete Characterization of Group-strategyproof Mechanisms of Cost-sharing

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Vidali, Angelina
Algorithms and Complexity, MPI for Informatics, Max Planck Society;

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Pountourakis, E., & Vidali, A. (2010). A Complete Characterization of Group-strategyproof Mechanisms of Cost-sharing. In M. de Berg, & U. Meyer (Eds.), Algorithms - ESA 2010 (pp. 146-157). Berlin: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-15775-2_13.

Zitierlink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-15DF-F

Zusammenfassung

We study the problem of designing group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms. The players report their bids for getting serviced and the mechanism decides a set of players that are going to be serviced and how much each one of them is going to pay. We determine three conditions: Fence Monotonicity, Stability of the allocation and Validity of the tie-breaking rule that are necessary and sufficient for group-strategyproofness, regardless of the cost function. Consequently, Fence Monotonicity characterizes group-strategyproof cost-sharing schemes closing an important open problem. Finally, we use our results to prove that there exist families of cost functions, where any group-strategyproof mechanism has arbitrarily poor budget balance.