Bidder Collusion and the Auction with Target Bids

Gorelkina, Olga

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Bidder Collusion and the Auction with Target Bids

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Gorelkina, Olga
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2014_10online.pdf
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Citation

Gorelkina, O. (2014). Bidder Collusion and the Auction with Target Bids.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6E38-2

Abstract

This paper studies collusion in one-shot auctions, where a buyer can bribe his competitors into lowering their bids. We modify the single-unit Vickrey auction to incite deviations from the designated-winner scenario and thus undermine collusion. The construction of mechanism does not require the knowledge of colluders’ identities or distributions of valuations, in which sense it is entirely detail-free.