Robust Routing Made Easy

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Abstract

Designing routing schemes is a multidimensional and complex task that depends on the objective function, the computational model (centralized vs. distributed), and the amount of uncertainty (online vs. offline). Nevertheless, there are quite a few well-studied general techniques, for a large variety of network problems. In contrast, in our view, practical techniques for designing *robust* routing schemes are scarce; while fault-tolerance has been studied from a number of angles, existing approaches are concerned with dealing with faults after the fact by rerouting, self-healing, or similar techniques. We argue that this comes at a high burden for the designer, as in such a system any algorithm must account for the effects of faults on communication.

With the goal of initiating efforts towards addressing this issue, we showcase simple and generic transformations that can be used as a blackbox to increase resilience against (independently distributed) faults. Given a network and a routing scheme, we determine a reinforced network and corresponding routing scheme that faithfully preserves the specification and behavior of the original scheme. We show that reasonably small constant overheads in terms of size of the new network compared to the old are sufficient for substantially relaxing the reliability requirements on individual components. The main message in this paper is that the task of designing a robust routing scheme can be decoupled into (i) designing a routing scheme that meets the specification in a fault-free environment, (ii) ensuring that nodes correspond to fault-containment regions, i.e., fail (approximately) independently, and (iii) applying our transformation to obtain a reinforced network and a robust routing scheme that is fault-tolerant.

Keywords. Fault-tolerant, reinforcements, networks, routing schemes, grids, minor-free graphs.

1 Introduction

When scaling up the size of systems, one inevitably faces the challenge of sufficiently enhancing reliability to ensure intended operation. Specifically, this applies to the communication infrastructure, which must remain operational despite failures of some components. Otherwise, isolated faults would bring down the entire system, which is impractical unless the failure probability of individual components is so small that it is

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likely that none of them fail. Existing designs and algorithms (that are considered practical) do account for lost messages and, in some cases, permanently crash-failing nodes or edges [CLM12, KKD10, PNK⁺06].

It is our understanding that handling stronger fault types is considered practically infeasible, be it in terms of complexity of implementations or the involved overheads. However, pretending that crash failures are the worst that can happen means that the entire system possibly fails whenever, e.g., we face a "babbling idiot" (i.e., a node erroneously generating many messages and congesting the network), excessive link delays (violating specification), or misrouting, corruption, or loss of messages. The current approach is to (i) use techniques like error correction, acknowledging reception, etc. to mask the effects of such faults, (ii) hope to detect and deactivate faulty components quickly (logically mapping faults to crashes), and (iii) repair or replace the faulty components after they have been taken offline. This strategy may result in significant disruption of applications; possible consequences include:

(I) Severe delays in execution, as successful message delivery necessitates to detect and deactivate faulty components first. (II) Failure to deliver correct messages and the resulting repeated attempts to do so (both by applications or routing algorithms) overload the network; the resulting congestion then renders the system inoperative as a whole. (III) Constraints on message delivery times are violated, breaking any real-time service. (IV) More generally, any instance of the classic fallacy of assuming that the network is reliable [RGO] may cause secondary errors.

In this paper, we challenge the belief that resilience to strong fault types is intractable in practice. We discuss generic approaches to reinforcing networks at small constant overheads (in terms of resources like nodes, links, latency, and energy) to achieve resilience to non-crash faults (up to fully Byzantine, i.e., arbitrary behavior). The proposed strategies are deliberately extremely simple, both in terms of applying them and analyzing them. Yet, they substantially reduce the required reliability on the component level to maintain network functionality, without losing messages or increasing latencies. We provide transformations that allow for directly reusing non-fault-tolerant routing schemes as a blackbox, avoiding the need to refactor working solutions. The main message we seek to convey is that being prepared for non-benign faults can be simple, affordable, and practical, and therefore enables building larger reliable networks.

The Challenge. The task we set out for ourselves is the following. We are given a synchronous network G = (V, E) and a routing scheme. We seek to allocate additional resources (nodes, edges) to the network and provide a corresponding routing strategy to simulate the routing scheme on the original network despite non-benign node failures. The goals are to (i) use little additional resources, (ii) maximize the probability of uniformly independently random node failures the network is likely to withstand, (iii) ensure that the transformation is simple to implement, and (iv) interferes as little as possible with the existing system design and operation, e.g., does not change the reinforced system's specification. Note that both (iii) and (iv) are crucial for practical utility; significant refactoring of existing systems and/or accommodating substantial design constraints is rarely affordable.

This setting makes a number of simplifying assumptions. First and probably most notably, we assume independent failures. This is motivated by the fact that highly correlated faults necessitate high degrees of redundancy and thus overheads; clearly, a

system-wide power outage, whether rare or not, cannot be addressed by adding extra nodes or edges that are connected to the same power source, but requires independent backup power. More generally, guaranteeing full functionality despite having f adversarially placed faults trivially requires node degrees larger than f. As there are many reasons why topologies of communication networks feature very small degrees in practice, assuming worst-case distribution of faults would hence come at too high of a cost. Instead, we aim at masking faults with little or no correlation among each other, arguing that resilience to such faults can be boosted significantly. Second, in this context we treat nodes and their outgoing links as fault-containment regions (according to [Kop03]), i.e., they are the basic components our systems are comprised of. This choice is made for the sake of concreteness; similar results could be obtained when considering, e.g., edge failures, without changing the gist of results or techniques. With these considerations in mind, the probability of uniformly random node failures that the reinforced system can tolerate is a canonical choice for measuring resilience. Third, we focus on synchronous networks. This has several reasons: we believe synchrony helps in handling faults, both on the theoretical level (as illustrated by the famous FLP theorem [FLP85]) and for ensuring correct implementation; it simplifies presentation, making it easier to focus on the proposed concepts; last but not least, we believe our approach to be of particular interest in the context of real-time systems, where the requirement of meeting hard deadlines makes synchrony an especially attractive choice.

Techniques and Results. Our first approach is almost trivial: We replace each node by $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$ copies and for each edge we connect each pair of copies of its endpoints, where ℓ is a constant. Whenever a message would be sent over an edge in the original graph, it should be sent over each copy of the edge in the reinforced graph. If not too many copies of a given node fail, this enables each receiving copy to recover the correct message. Thus, each non-faulty copy of a node can run the routing algorithm as if it were the original node, guaranteeing that it has the same view of the system state as its original in the corresponding fault-free execution of the routing scheme on the original graph.

We observe that, asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s., with probability 1-o(1)) and with $\ell=2f+1$, this reinforcement can sustain an independent probability p of Byzantine node failures for any $p\in o(n^{-1/(f+1)})$. This threshold is sharp up to (small) constant factors: for $p\in \omega(n^{-1/(f+1)})$, a.a.s. there is some node for which all of its copies fail. If we restrict the fault model to omission faults (faulty nodes may skip sending some messages), $\ell=f+1$ suffices. The cost of this reinforcement is that the number of nodes and edges increase by factors of ℓ and ℓ^2 , respectively. Therefore, already this simplistic solution can support non-crash faults of probability $p\in o(1/\sqrt{n})$ at a factor-4 overhead. Note that the simulation introduces no big computational overhead and does not change the way the system works, enabling to use it as a blackbox. Randomized algorithms can be simulated as well, provided that all copies of a node have access to a shared source of randomness; note that this requirement is much weaker than globally shared randomness: it makes sense to place the copies of a node in physical proximity to approximately preserve the geometrical layout of the physical realization of the network topology.

We then proceed to reducing the involved overhead further. To this end, we apply the

¹Choosing concreteness over generality, we focus on the, in our view, most interesting case of constant ℓ. It is straightforward to generalize the analysis.

above strategy only to a small subset E' of the edge set. Denoting by v_1, \ldots, v_ℓ the copies of node $v \in V$, for any remaining edge $\{v, w\} \in E$ we add only edges $\{v_i, w_i\}$, $i \in [\ell]$, to the reinforced graph. The idea is to choose E' in a way such that the connected components induced by $E \setminus E'$ are of constant size. This results in the same asymptotic threshold for p, while the number of edges of the reinforced graph drops to $((1-\varepsilon)\ell+\varepsilon\ell^2)|E|$. For constant ε , we give constructions with this property for grids or tori of constant dimension and minor-free graphs of bounded degree. Again, we consider the case of f = 1 of particular interest: in many typical network topologies, we can reinforce the network to boost the failure probability that can be tolerated from $\Theta(1/n)$ to $\Omega(1/\sqrt{n})$ by roughly doubling (omission faults) or tripling (Byzantine faults) the number of nodes and edges.

The redundancy in this second construction is near-optimal under the constraint that we want to simulate arbitrary routing scheme in a blackbox fashion, as it entails that we need a surviving copy of each edge, and thus in particular each node. While one may argue that the paid price is steep, in many cases it will be smaller than the price for making each individual component sufficiently reliable to avoid this overhead. Furthermore, we briefly argue that the simplicity of our constructions enables us to re-purpose the redundant resources in applications with less strict reliability requirements.

We wrap up our presentation by suggesting some open problems which we consider of interest for further developing the proposed paradigm of reinforcement against nonbenign faults.

Related work. Local Byzantine faults were studied in [DH08, PP05] in the context of broadcast and consensus problems. Unlike its global classical counterpart, the f-local Byzantine adversary can control at most f neighbors of each vertex. This more restricted adversary gives rise to more scalable solutions, as the problems can be solved in networks of degree O(f); without this restriction, degrees need to be proportional to the *total* number of faults in the network.

We also limit our adversary in its selection of Byzantine nodes, by requiring that the faulty nodes are chosen independently at random. As illustrated, e.g., by Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, there is a close connection between the two settings. Informally, we show what certain values of p correspond, asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s), to an f-local Byzantine adversary. However, we diverge from the approach in [DH08, PP05] in that we require a fully time-preserving simulation of a fault-free routing schedule, as opposed to solving the routing task in the reinforced network from scratch.

There is large variety of other approaches to fault-tolerant routing, which is fundamentally different in terms of requirements and solutions; we discuss these in Appendix A.

2 High-level Overview

In this section, we highlight the utility of decoupling the task of designing a valid reinforcement from the task of designing a routing scheme over the input network: one can just plug in any routing scheme, for any objective, e.g., load minimization, maximizing the throughput, etc., in various models of computation, e.g., centralized or distributed, randomized or deterministic, online or offline, or oblivious. We now sketch the guarantees and (mild) preconditions of our blackbox transformation informally (for formal specification see Sections 3).

Assumptions on the Input Network. We have two main assumptions on the network at hand: (1) We consider synchronous routing networks, and (2) each node in the network (alongside its outgoing links) is a fault-containment region, i.e., it fails independently from other nodes.

Valid Reinforcement Simulation Guarantees. Our reinforcements make a number of copies of each node. We have each non-faulty copy of a node run the routing algorithm as if it were the original node, guaranteeing that it has the same view of the system state as its original in the corresponding fault-free execution of the routing scheme on the original graph. Moreover, the simulation fully preserves all guarantees of the schedule, including its timing, and introduces no big computational overhead.

Unaffected Complexity and Cost Measures. When designing a routing scheme, one optimizes its complexity, e.g., in terms of running time for centralized algorithms, number of rounds for distributed algorithms, message size, etc. This is balanced against its quality with respect to the objective function of the problem at hand, e.g., load minimization, maximizing the throughput, minimizing the latency, etc. Moreover, there is the degree of uncertainty that can be sustained, e.g., whether the input to the algorithm is fully available at the beginning of the computation (offline computation) or revealed over time (online computation). Our reinforcements preserve all of these properties, as they operate in a blackbox fashion. For example, our machinery readily yields various fault-tolerant packet routing algorithms in the Synchronous Store-and-Forward model by Aiello et. al [AKOR03]. More specifically, from [EMP15] we obtain a centralized deterministic online algorithms on unidirectional grids of constant dimension that achieves a competitive ratio which is polylogarithmic in the number of nodes of the input network w.r.t. throughput maximization. Using [EMR16] instead, we get a centralized randomized offline algorithm on the unidirectional line with constant approximation ratio w.r.t. throughput maximization. In the case that deadlines need to be met the approximation ratio is, roughly, $O(\log^* n)$ [RR11]. As a final example, one can obtain from [AKK09] various online distributed algorithms with sublinear competitive ratios w.r.t. throughput maximization.

Cost and Gains of the Reinforcement. The price of adding fault-tolerance is given by the increase in the network size, i.e., the number of nodes and edges of the reinforced network in comparison to the original one. Due to the assumed independence of node failures, it is straightforward to see that the (uniform) probability of sustainable node faults increases roughly like $n^{-1/(f+1)}$ in return for (i) a linear-in-f increase in the number of nodes and (ii) an increase in the number of edges that is quadratic in f. We then proceed to improve the construction for grids and minor-free constant-degree graphs to reduce the increase in the number of edges to linear in f. Based on this information, one can then assess the effort in terms of these additional resources that is beneficial, as less reliable nodes in turn are cheaper to build, maintain, and operate. We also note that, due to the ability of the reinforced network to ensure ongoing unrestricted operability in the presence of some faulty nodes, faulty nodes can be replaced or repaired before communication is impaired or breaks down.

Preprocessing. Preprocessing is used, e.g., in computing routing tables in Oblivious Routing [Räc09]. The reinforcement simply uses the output of such a preprocessing stage in the same manner as the original algorithm. In other words, the preprocessing is done on the input network and its output determines the input routing scheme. In particular, the preprocessing may be randomized and does not need to be modified in any way.

Randomization. Randomized routing algorithms can be simulated as well, provided that all copies of a node have access to a shared source of randomness. We remark that, as our scheme locally duplicates the network topology, it is natural to preserve the physical realization of the network topology in the sense that all (non-faulty) copies of a node are placed in physical proximity. This implies that this constraint is much easier to satisfy than globally shared randomness.

3 Preliminaries

We consider synchronous routing networks. Formally, the network is modeled as a directed graph G=(V,E), where V is the set of $n\triangleq |V|$ vertices, and E is the set of $m\triangleq |E|$ edges (or links). Each node maintains a state, based on which it decides in each round for each of its outgoing links which message to transmit. We are not concerned with the inner workings of the node, i.e., how the state is updated; rather, we assume that we are given a scheduling algorithm performing the task of updating this state and use it in our blackbox transformations. In particular, we allow for online, distributed, and randomized algorithms.

Probability-p **Byzantine Faults Byz**(p). The set of faulty nodes $F \subseteq V$ is determined by sampling each $v \in V$ into F with independent probability p. Nodes in F may deviate from the protocol in arbitrary ways, including delaying, dropping, or forging messages, etc.

Probability-p **Omission Faults Om**(p). The set of faulty nodes $F \subseteq V$ is determined by sampling each $v \in V$ into F with independent probability p. Nodes in F may deviate from the protocol by not sending a message over an outgoing link when they should. We note that it is sufficient for this fault model to be satisfied *logically*. That is, as long as a correct node can identify incorrect messages, it may simply drop them, resulting in the same behavior of the system at all correct nodes as if the message was never sent.

Simulations and Reinforcement. For a given network G = (V, E) and a scheduling algorithm A, we will seek to reinforce (G, A) by constructing G' = (V', E') and scheduling algorithm A' such that the original algorithm A is simulated by A' on G', where G' is subject to random node failures. We now formalize these notions. First, we require that there is a projection (i.e., surjective mapping) $P: V' \to V$; fix G' and P, and choose $F' \subseteq V'$ randomly as specified above.

Definition 1 (Simulation under Byz(p)). Assume that in each round $r \in \mathbb{N}$, each $v' \in V' \setminus F'$ is given the same input by the environment as P(v'). A' is a simulation of A

under $\mathsf{Byz}(p)$, if for each $v \in V$, a strict majority of the nodes $v' \in V'$ with P(v') = v computes in each round $r \in \mathbb{N}$ the state of v in A in this round. The simulation is strong, if not only for each $v \in V$ there is a strict majority doing so, but all $v' \in V' \setminus F'$ compute the state of P(v') in each round.

Definition 2 (Simulation under Om(p)). Assume that in each round $r \in \mathbb{N}$, each $v' \in V'$ is given the same input by the environment as P(v'). A' is a simulation of A under Om(p), if for each $v \in V$, there is $v' \in V'$ with P(v') = v that computes in each round $r \in \mathbb{N}$ the state of v in A in this round. The simulation is strong, if each $v' \in V'$ computes the state of P(v') in each round.

Definition 3 (Reinforcement). A (strong) reinforcement of a graph G = (V, E) is a graph G' = (V', E'), a projection $P \colon V' \to V$, and a way of determining a scheduling algorithm A' for G' out of scheduling algorithm A for G. The reinforcement is valid under the given fault model (Byz(p) or Om(p)) if A' is a (strong) simulation of A a.a.s.

Resources and Performance Measures. We use the following performance measures. (i) The probability p of independent node failures that can be sustained a.a.s. (ii) The ratio $\nu \triangleq |V'|/|V|$, i.e., the relative increase in the number of nodes. (iii) The ratio $\eta \triangleq |E'|/|E|$, i.e., the relative increase in the number of edges. In Appendix B we briefly discuss, from a practical point of view, why we do not explicitly consider further metrics that are of interest.

4 Strong Reinforcement under Byz(p)

Given are the input network G = (V, E) and scheduling algorithm A. Fix a parameter $f \in \mathbb{N}$ and set $\ell = 2f + 1$.

Reinforced Network G'. We set $V' \triangleq V \times [\ell]$, where $[\ell] \triangleq \{1, \ldots, \ell\}$, and denote $v_i \triangleq (v, i)$. Accordingly, $P(v_i) \triangleq v$. We define $E' \triangleq \{(v', w') \in V' \times V' \mid (P(v'), P(w')) \in E\}$.

Strong Simulation A' of A. Consider node $v' \in V' \setminus F'$. We want to maintain the invariant that in each round, each such node has a copy of the state of v = P(v') in A. To this end, v'

- (1) initializes local copies of all state variables of v as in A,
- (2) sends on each link $(v', w') \in E'$ in each round the message v would send on (P(v'), P(w')) when executing A, and
- (3) for each neighbor w of P(v') and each round r, updates the local copy of the state of A as if v received the message that has been sent to v' by at least f+1 of the nodes w' with P(w') = w (each one using edge (w', v')).

Naturally, the last step requires such a majority to exist; otherwise, the simulation fails. We show that A' can be executed and simulates A provided that for each $v \in V$, no more than f of its copies are in F'.

Lemma 1. Suppose that for each $v \in V$, $|\{v_i \in F'\}| \leq f$. Then A' strongly simulates A.

Proof. We show the claim by induction on the round number $r \in \mathbb{N}$, where we consider the initialization to anchor the induction at r = 0. For the step from r to r + 1, observe that because all $v' \in V' \setminus F'$ have a copy of the state of P(v') at the end of round r by the induction hypothesis, each of them can correctly determine the message P(v') would send over link $(v, w) \in E$ in round r + 1 and send it over each $(v', w') \in E$ with P(w') = w. Accordingly, each $v' \in V' \setminus F'$ receives the message A would send over $(w, v) \in E$ from each $w' \in V' \setminus F'$ with P(w') = w (via the link (w', v')). By the assumption of the lemma, we have at least $\ell - f = f + 1$ such nodes, implying that v' updates the local copy of the state of A as if it received the same messages as when executing A in round r + 1. Thus, the induction step succeeds and the proof is complete.

Resilience of the Reinforcement. We now examine how large the probability p can be for the precondition of Lemma 1 to be satisfied a.a.s.

Theorem 2. Assume that $p \in o(1)$. Then the above construction is a valid strong reinforcement for the fault model Byz(p) if $p \in o(n^{-1/(f+1)})$. Moreover, if G contains $\Omega(n)$ nodes with non-zero outdegree, $p \in \omega(n^{-1/(f+1)})$ implies that the reinforcement is not valid.

Proof. By Lemma 1, A' strongly simulates A if for each $v \in V$, $|\{v_i \in F'\}| \leq f$. If $p \in o(n^{-1/(f+1)}) \cap o(1)$, using $\ell = 2f + 1$ and a union bound we see that the probability of this event is at most

$$1 - n \sum_{j=f+1}^{2f+1} {2f+1 \choose j} p^j (1-p)^{2f+1-j} \ge 1 - n \sum_{j=f+1}^{2f+1} {2f+1 \choose j} p^j$$

$$\ge 1 - n {2f+1 \choose f+1} p^{f+1} \sum_{j=0}^f p^j \in 1 - n(2e)^f p^{f+1} (1+o(1)) = 1 - o(1).$$

Here, the second last step uses that $\binom{a}{b} \leq (ae/b)^b$ and that $p \in o(1)$, while the last step exploits that $p \in o(n^{-1/(f+1)})$.

On the other hand, for any $v \in V$, the probability that $|\{v_i \in F'\}| > f$ is independent of the same event for other nodes and larger than $\binom{2f+1}{f+1}p^{f+1} \geq (3/2)^f p^{f+1}$, since $\binom{a}{b} \geq (a/b)^b$. Hence, if G contains $\Omega(n)$ nodes v with non-zero outdegree, $p \in \omega(n^{-1/(f+1)}) \cap o(1)$ implies that the probability that there is some node v with $|\{v_i \in F'\}| > f$ is in $1 - \left(1 - \left(\frac{3}{2}\right)^f p^{f+1}\right)^{\Omega(n)} \subseteq 1 - \left(1 - \omega\left(\frac{1}{n}\right) \cap o(1)\right)^{\Omega(n)} = 1 - o(1)$. If there is such a node v, there are algorithms A and inputs so that A sends a message across some edge (v, w) in some round. If faulty nodes do not send messages in this round, the nodes $w_i \in V' \setminus F'$ do not receive the correct message from more than f nodes v_i and the simulation fails. Hence, the reinforcement cannot be valid.

We remark that for constant p, one can determine suitable values of $f \in \Theta(\log n)$ using Chernoff's bound. However, as our focus is on small (constant) overhead factors, we refrain from presenting the calculation here.

Efficiency of the Reinforcement. For $f \in \mathbb{N}$, we have that $\nu = \ell = 2f + 1$ and $\eta = \ell^2 = 4f^2 + 4f + 1$, while we can sustain $p \in o(n^{-1/(f+1)})$. In the special case of

f=1, we improve from $p \in o(1/n)$ for the original network to $p \in o(1/\sqrt{n})$ by tripling the number of nodes. However, $\eta=9$, i.e., while the number of edges also increases only by a constant, it seems too large in systems where the limiting factor is the amount of links that can be afforded.

5 Strong Reinforcement under Om(p)

The strong reinforcement from the previous section is, trivially, also a strong reinforcement under $\mathsf{Om}(p)$. However, we can reduce the number of copies per node for the weaker fault model. Given are the input network G = (V, E) and scheduling algorithm A. Fix a parameter $f \in \mathbb{N}$ and, this time, set $\ell = f + 1$.

Reinforced Network G'. We set $V' \triangleq V \times [\ell]$ and denote $v_i \triangleq (v, i)$. Accordingly, $P(v_i) \triangleq v$. We define $E' \triangleq \{(v', w') \in V' \times V' \mid (P(v'), P(w')) \in E\}$.

Strong Simulation A' of A. Each node $v' \in V'$

- (1) initializes local copies of all state variables of v as in A,
- (2) sends on each link $(v', w') \in E'$ in each round the message v would send on (P(v'), P(w')) when executing A, and
- (3) for each neighbor w of P(v') and each round r, updates the local copy of the state of A as if v received the (unique) message that has been sent to v' by some of the nodes w' with P(w') = w (each one using edge (w', v')).

Naturally, the last step assumes that some such neighbor sends a message and all w' with P(w') send the same such message; otherwise, the simulation fails. We show that A' can be executed and simulates A provided that for each $v \in V$, no more than f of its copies are in F'.

Corollary 3. If for each $v \in V$, $|\{v_i \in F'\}| \leq f$, A' strongly simulates A.

Resilience of the Reinforcement. We now examine how large the probability p can be for the precondition of Lemma 1 to be satisfied a.a.s.

Theorem 4. The above construction is a valid strong reinforcement for the fault model Om(p) if $p \in o(n^{-1/(f+1)})$. If G contains $\Omega(n)$ nodes with non-zero outdegree, $p \in \omega(n^{-1/(f+1)})$ implies that the reinforcement is not valid.

Proof. By Corollary 3, A' strongly simulates A if for each $v \in V$, $|\{v_i \in F'\}| \le f = \ell - 1$. For $v \in V$, $\Pr[\{v_i \mid i \in [\ell]\} \cap F' = \ell] = p^{f+1}$. By a union bound, A' thus simulates A with probability 1 - o(1) if $p \in o(n^{-1/(f+1)})$.

Conversely, if there are $\Omega(n)$ nodes with non-zero outdegree and $p \in \omega(n^{-1/(f+1)})$, with probability 1 - o(1) all copies of at least one such node v are faulty. If v sends a message under A, but all corresponding messages of copies of v are not sent, the simulation fails. This shows that in this case the reinforcement is not valid.

 $^{^2}$ Nodes suffering omission failures still can simulate A correctly.

Efficiency of the Reinforcement. For $f \in \mathbb{N}$, we have that $\nu = \ell = f + 1$ and $\eta = \ell^2 = f^2 + 2f + 1$, while we can sustain $p \in o(n^{-1/(f+1)})$. In the special case of f = 1, we improve from $p \in o(1/n)$ for the original network to $p \in o(1/\sqrt{n})$ by doubling the number of nodes and quadrupling the number of edges.

6 More Efficient Reinforcement

In this section, we reduce the overhead in terms of edges at the expense of obtaining only a (non-strong) reinforcement. We stress that the obtained trade-off between redundancy $(\nu \text{ and } \eta)$ and the sustainable probability of faults p is asymptotically optimal: as we require to preserve arbitrary routing schemes in a blackbox fashion, we need sufficient redundancy on the link level to directly simulate communication. From this observation, both for $\mathsf{Om}(p)$ and $\mathsf{Byz}(p)$ we can readily derive trivial lower bounds on redundancy that match the constructions below up to lower-order terms.

6.1 A Toy Example

Before we give the construction, we give some intuition on how we can reduce the number of required edges. Consider the following simple case. G is a single path of n vertices (v_1, \ldots, v_n) , and the schedule requires that in round i, a message is sent from v_i to v_{i+1} . We would like to use a "budget" of only an additional n vertices and an additional $(1 + \varepsilon)m = (1 + \varepsilon)(n - 1)$ links, assuming the fault model Om(p). One approach is to duplicate the path and extend the routing scheme accordingly. We already used our entire budget apart from εm links! This reinforcement is valid as long as one of the paths succeeds in delivering the message all the way. The probability that one of the paths "survives" is $1 - (1 - (1 - p)^n)^2 \le 1 - (1 - e^{-pn})^2 \le e^{-2pn}$, where we used that $1-x \le e^{-x}$ for any $x \in \mathbb{R}$. Hence, for any $p = \omega(1/n)$, the survival probability is o(1). In contrast, the strong reinforcement with $\ell = 2$ (i.e., $\ell = 1$) given in Section 5 sustains any $p \in o(1/\sqrt{n})$ with probability 1 - o(1); however, while it adds $\ell = n$ nodes only, it requires $\ell = n$ additional edges.

We need to add some additional edges to avoid that the likelihood of the message reaching its destination drops too quickly. To this end, we use the remaining εm edges to "cross" between the two paths every $h \triangleq 2/\varepsilon$ hops (assume h is an integer), c.f. Figure 1. This splits the path into segments of h nodes each. As long as, for each such segment, in one of its copies all nodes survive, the message is delivered. For a given segment, this occurs with probability $1 - (1 - (1 - p)^h)^2 \ge 1 - (ph)^2$. Overall, the message is thus delivered with probability at least $(1 - (ph)^2)^{n/h} \ge 1 - nhp^2$. As for any constant ε , h is a constant, this means that the message is delivered a.a.s. granted that $p \in o(1/\sqrt{n})!$

6.2 Partitioning the Graph

To apply this strategy to other graphs, we must take into account that there can be multiple intertwined routing paths. However, the key point in the above example was not that we had path segments, but rather that we partitioned the nodes into constant-size regions and used a few edges inside these regions only, while fully connecting the copies of nodes at the boundary of the regions.




Figure 1: On the right: a toy example. n = 9, m = 8, $\varepsilon = 1/2$, h = 4. The number of additional edges is $(1 + \varepsilon)m$, instead of 3m as in the strong reinforcement construction. On the left: a 6-ary 2-dimensional hypercube. The subdivision of the node set into 2-ary 2-dimensional subcubes is illustrated by dotted lines.

In general, it is not possible to partition the nodes into constant-sized subsets such that only a very small fraction of the edges connects different subsets; any graph with good expansion is a counter-example. Fortunately, many network topologies used in practice are not expanders. We focus in this section on grid networks and minor free graphs and show how to apply the above strategy in each of these families of graphs.

Grid Networks. We can generalize the above strategy to hypercubes of dimension d > 1.

Definition 4 (Hypercube Networks). A q-ary d-dimensional hypercube has node set $[q]^d$ and two nodes are adjacent if they agree on all but one index $i \in [d]$, for which $|v_i - w_i| = 1$.

The proof of the following lemma is in Appendix C.

Lemma 5. For any $h, d \in \mathbb{N}$, assume that h divides $q \in \mathbb{N}$ and set $\varepsilon = 1/h$. Then the q-ary d-dimensional hypercube can be partitioned into $(q/h)^d$ regions of h^d nodes such that at most an ε -fraction of the edges connects nodes from different regions.

Note that the above result and proof extend to tori, which also include the "wrap-around" edges connecting the first and last nodes in any given dimension.

Minor free Graphs. Another general class of graphs that can be partitioned in a similar fashion are minor-free bounded-degree graph.

Definition 5 (H-Minor free Graphs). For a fixed graph H, H is a minor of G if H is isomorphic to a graph that can be obtained by zero or more edge contractions on a subgraph of G. We say that a graph G is H-minor free if H is not a minor of G.

For any such graph, we can apply a Corollary from [LR15, Coro. 2] which is based on [AST90] to construct a suitable partition.

Theorem 6 ([LR15]). Let H be a fixed graph. There is a constant c(H) > 1 such that for every $\varepsilon \in (0,1]$, every H-minor free graph G = (V,E) with degree bounded by Δ a partition $R_1, \ldots, R_k \subseteq V$ with the following properties can be found in time $O(|V|^{3/2})$: (i) $\forall i : |R_i| \leq \frac{c(H)\Delta^2}{\varepsilon^2}$, (ii) $\forall i$ the subgraph induced by R_i in G is connected. (iii) $|\{(u,v) \mid u \in R_i, v \in R_j, i \neq j\}| \leq \varepsilon \cdot |V|$.

Remark 1. We remark that the grids and tori of dimension d > 2 are not minor-free.

We note that this construction is not satisfactory, as it involves large constants. It demonstrates that a large class of graphs is amenable to the suggested approach, but it is advisable to search for optimized constructions for specific graph families before applying the scheme.

Reinforced Network G' Equipped with a suitable partition of G = (V, E) into disjoint regions $R_1, \ldots, R_k \subseteq V$, we reinforce as follows. As before, we set $V' \triangleq V \times [\ell]$, denote $v_i \triangleq (v, i)$, define $P(v_i) \triangleq v$, and set $\ell \triangleq f+1$. However, the edge set of G' differs. For $e = (v, w) \in E$,

$$E'_{e} \triangleq \begin{cases} \{(v_{i}, w_{i}) \mid i \in [\ell]\} & \text{if } \exists k' \in [k] : v, w \in R_{k'} \\ \{(v_{i}, w_{j}) \mid i, j \in [\ell]\} & \text{else.} \end{cases}$$

and we set $E' \triangleq \bigcup_{e \in E} E'_e$.

6.3 Simulation under Om(p)

Consider $v \in V$. We want to maintain the invariant that in each round, some v_i has a copy of the state of v in A. To this end, $v' \in V'$

- (1) initializes local copies of all state variables of v as in A and sets $know_{v'} = \mathbf{true}$;
- (2) sends on each link $(v', w') \in E'$ in each round
 - the message P(v') would send on (P(v'), P(w')) when executing A if $know_{v'} =$ **true** and P(v') would send a message,
 - a special symbol \perp if $know_{v'} = \mathbf{true}$ and v would not send a message on (P(v'), P(w')) when executing A, or
 - no message if $know_{v'} = \mathbf{false}$;
- (3) if, in a given round, $know_{v'} = \mathbf{true}$ and v' receives for each neighbor w of P(v') a message from some $w_j \in V'$, it updates the local copy of the state of v in A as if P(v') received this message (interpreting \bot as no message); and
- (4) if this is not the case, v' sets $know_{v'} =$ false.

We claim that as long as $know_{v'} = \mathbf{true}$ at v', v' has indeed a copy of the state of P(v') in the corresponding execution of A; therefore, it can send the right messages and update its state variables correctly.

Lemma 7. Suppose that for each $k' \in [k]$, there is some $i \in [\ell]$ so that $\{v_i \mid v \in R_{k'}\} \cap F' = \emptyset$. Then A' simulates A.

Proof. Select for each $R_{k'}$, $k' \in [k]$, some i such that $\{v_i \mid v \in R_{k'}\} \cap F' = \emptyset$ and denote by C the union of all these nodes. As P(C) = V, it suffices to show that each $v' \in C$ successfully maintains a copy of the state of P(v') under A. However, we also need to make sure that each sent message is "correct," in the sense that a message sent over edge $(v', w') \in E'$ in round r would be sent by A over (P(v'), P(w')) (where \bot means no message is sent). Therefore, we will argue that the set of nodes $T_r \triangleq \{v' \in V' \mid know_{v'} = \mathbf{true} \text{ in round } r\}$ knows the state of their counterpart P(v') under A up to and including round $r \in \mathbb{N}$. As nodes v' with $know_{v'} = \mathbf{false}$ do not send any messages, this invariant guarantees that all sent messages are correct in the above sense.

We now show by induction on the round number $r \in \mathbb{N}$ that (i) each $v' \in T_r$ knows the state of P(v') under A and (ii) $C \subseteq T_r$. Due to initialization, this is correct initially, i.e., in "round 0;" we use this to anchor the induction at r = 0, setting $T_0 \triangleq V'$.

For the step from r to r+1, note that because all $v' \in T_r$ have a copy of the state of P(v') at the end of round r by the induction hypothesis, each of them can correctly determine the message P(v') would send over link $(v, w) \in E$ in round r+1 and send it over each $(v', w') \in E'$ with P(w') = w. Recall that $v' \in T_{r+1}$ if and only if $v' \in T_r$ and for each $(w, P(v')) \in E$ there is at least one $w' \in V'$ with P(w') = w from which v' receives a message. Since under Om(p) nodes in F' may only omit sending messages, it follows that $v' \in T_{r+1}$ correctly updates the state variables of P(v'), just as P(v') would in round r+1 of A.

It remains to show that $C \subseteq T_{r+1}$. Consider $v_i \in C$ and $(w,v) \in E$. If $v,w \in R_{k'}$ for some $k' \in [k]$, then $w_i \in C$ by definition of C. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, $w_i \in T_r$, and w_i will send the message w would send in round r+1 of A over $(w,v) \in E$ to v_i , using the edge $(w_i,v_i) \in E'$. If this is not the case, then there is some $j \in [\ell]$ such that $w_j \in C$ and we have that $(w_j,v_i) \in E'$. Again, v_i will receive the message w would send in round r+1 of A from w_j . We conclude that v_i receives at least one copy of the message from w for each $(w,v) \in E$, implying that $v \in T_{r+1}$ as claimed. Thus, the induction step succeeds and the proof is complete.

Resilience of the Reinforcement. Denote $R \triangleq \max_{k' \in [k]} \{|R_{k'}|\}$ and $r \triangleq \min_{k' \in [k]} \{|R_{k'}|\}$.

Theorem 8. The above construction is a valid reinforcement for the fault model Om(p) if $p \in o((n/r)^{-1/(f+1)}/R)$. Moreover, if G contains $\Omega(n)$ nodes with non-zero outdegree and $R \in O(1)$, $p \in \omega(n^{-1/(f+1)})$ implies that the reinforcement is not valid.

Proof. By Lemma 7, A' simulates A if for each $k' \in [k]$, there is some $i \in [\ell]$ so that $\{v_i \mid v \in R_{k'}\} \cap F' = \emptyset$. For fixed k' and $i \in [\ell]$, $\Pr\left[\{v_i \mid v \in R_{k'}\} \cap F' = \emptyset\right] = (1-p)^{|R_{k'}|} \ge 1 - Rp$. Accordingly, the probability that for a given k' the precondition of the lemma is violated is at most $(Rp)^{f+1}$. As $k \le n/r$, taking a union bound over all k' yields that with probability at least $1 - n/r \cdot (Rp)^{f+1}$, A' simulates A. Therefore, the reinforcement is valid if $p \in O((n/r)^{-1/(f+1)}/R)$.

Now assume that $r \leq R \in O(1)$ and that $p \in \omega(n^{-1/(f+1)}) = \omega((n/r)^{-1/(f+1)}/R)$. Thus, for each $v \in V$, all $v' \in V'$ with P(v') = v simultaneously end up in F' with probability $\omega(1/n)$. Therefore, if $\Omega(n)$ nodes have non-zero outdegree, with a probability in $1 - (1 - \omega(1/n))^{\Omega(n)} = 1 - o(1)$ for at least one such node v all its copies end up in F'. In this case, the simulation fails if v sends a message under A, but all copies of v' suffer omission failures in the respective round.

Efficiency of the Reinforcement. For $f \in \mathbb{N}$, we have that $\nu = \ell = f + 1$ and $\eta = (1 - \varepsilon)\ell + \varepsilon\ell^2 = 1 + (1 + \varepsilon)f + \varepsilon f^2$, while we can sustain $p \in o(n^{-1/(f+1)})$. In the special case of f = 1 and $\varepsilon = 1/5$, we improve from $p \in o(1/n)$ for the original network to $p \in o(1/\sqrt{n})$ by doubling the number of nodes and multiplying the number of edges by 2.4.

³We slightly abuse notation, as $\omega(1/n)$ could mean values larger than 1; however, as this term represents a probability, it can be at most 1.

We remark that in the case of hypercubes and tori, the asymptotic notation for p does not hide huge constants. Using Lemma 5, we see that h enters the threshold Theorem 8 provides as $h^{-d+1/2}$; as the cases of d=2 and d=3 are the most typical (grids and tori of higher dimension suffer from large distortion when embedding them into 3-dimensional space), the threshold on p degrades by factors of 11.2 and 55.9, respectively.

6.4 Simulation under Byz(p)

The same strategy can be applied for the stronger fault model $\mathsf{Byz}(p)$, if we switch back to having $\ell = 2f + 1$ copies and nodes accepting the majority message among all messages from copies of a neighbor in the original graph.

Consider node $v \in V$. We want to maintain the invariant that in each round, a majority among the nodes v_i , $i \in [\ell]$, has a copy of the state of v in A. For $v' \in V'$ and $(w, P(v')) \in E$, set $N_{v'}(w) \triangleq \{w' \in V' \mid (w', v') \in E'\}$. With this notation, v' behaves as follows

- (1) It initializes local copies of all state variables of v as in A.
- (2) It sends in each round on each link $(v', w') \in E'$ the message v would send on (P(v'), P(w')) when executing A (if v' cannot compute this correctly, it may send an arbitrary message).
- (3) It updates its state in round r as if it received, for each $(w, P(v')) \in E$, the message the majority of nodes in $N_{v'}(w)$ sent.

The proof of the following lemma is in Appendix C.

Lemma 9. Suppose that for each $k' \in [k]$, there are at least f + 1 indices $i \in [\ell]$ so that $\{v_i \mid v \in R_{k'}\} \cap F' = \emptyset$. Then A' simulates A.

Resilience of the Reinforcement. Denote $R \triangleq \max_{k' \in [k]} \{|R_{k'}|\}$ and $r \triangleq \min_{k' \in [k]} \{|R_{k'}|\}$.

Theorem 10. Assume that $Rp \in o(1)$. The above construction is a valid reinforcement for the fault model Byz(p) if $p \in o((n/r)^{-1/(f+1)}/R)$. Moreover, if G contains $\Omega(n)$ nodes with non-zero outdegree and $R \in O(1)$, $p \in \omega(n^{-1/(f+1)})$ implies that the reinforcement is not valid.

Proof. By Lemma 9, A' simulates A if for each $k' \in [k]$, there are at least f+1 indices $i \in [\ell]$ so that $\{v_i \mid v \in R_{k'}\} \cap F' = \emptyset$. For fixed k' and $i \in [\ell]$, $\Pr\left[\{v_i \mid v \in R_{k'}\} \cap F' = \emptyset\right] = (1-p)^{|R_{k'}|} \ge 1-Rp$. Thus, analogous to the proof of Theorem 2, the probability that for a given k' the condition is violated is at most $\sum_{j=f+1}^{2f+1} \binom{2f+1}{j} (Rp)^j (1-Rp)^{2f+1-j} \in (2e)^f (Rp)^{f+1} (1+o(1))$. By a union bound over the at most n/r regions, we see that $p \in o((n/r)^{-1/(f+1)}/R)$ thus guarantees that the simulation succeeds a.a.s.

As $r \leq R \in O(1)$, the proof of the second statement is analogous to the respective statement of Theorem 2.

Efficiency of the Reinforcement. For $f \in \mathbb{N}$, we have that $\nu = \ell = 2f + 1$ and $\eta = (1 - \varepsilon)\ell + \varepsilon\ell^2 = 1 + (2 + 2\varepsilon)f + 4\varepsilon f^2$, while we can sustain $p \in o(n^{-1/(f+1)})$. In the special case of f = 1 and $\varepsilon = 1/5$, we improve from $p \in o(1/n)$ for the original network to $p \in o(1/\sqrt{n})$ by tripling the number of nodes and multiplying the number of edges by 4.2.

7 Discussion

In the previous sections, we have established that constant-factor redundancy can significantly increase reliability of the communication network in a blackbox fashion. Our constructions in Section 6 are close to optimal. Thus, one may argue that the costs are too high. However, apart from arguing that the costs of using sufficiently reliable components may be even higher, we would like to raise a number of additional points in favor of the approach.

Node Redundancy. When building a reliable large-scale system, fault-tolerance needs to be considered on all system levels. Unless nodes are sufficiently reliable, node replication is mandatory, regardless of the communication network. In other words, the node redundancy required by our construction may not be an actual overhead to begin with. When taking this point of view, the salient question becomes whether the increase in links is acceptable. Here, the first observation is that any system employing node redundancy will need to handle the arising additional communication, incurring the respective burden on the communication network. Apart from still having to handle the additional traffic, however, the system designer now needs to make sure that the network is sufficiently reliable for the node redundancy to matter. Our simple schemes then simply provide a means to provide the necessary communication infrastructure without running the risk of introducing, e.g., a single point of failure during the design of the communication network; at the same time, the design process is simplified and modularized.

Dynamic Faults. Due to the introduced fault-tolerance, faulty components do not impede the system as a whole, so long as the simulation of the routing scheme (and the actual computations by the nodes) can still be carried out. Hence, one may repair faulty nodes at runtime. If T is the time for detecting and fixing a fault, we can discretize time in units of T and denote by p_T the (assumed to be independent) probability that a node is faulty in a given time slot, which can be bounded by twice the probability to fail within T time. Then the failure probabilities we computed in our analysis directly translate to an upper bound on the expected fraction of time during which the system is not (fully) operational.

Adaptivity. The employed node- and link-level redundancy may be required for mission-critical applications only, or the system may run into capacity issues. In this case, we can exploit that the reinforced network has a very simple structure, making various adaptive strategies straightforward to implement. (i) One may simply use a subnetwork only, deactivating the remaining nodes and links, such that a reinforced network for smaller f (or a copy of the original network, if f=0) remains. This saves energy. (ii) One may subdivide the network into several smaller reinforced networks, each of which can perform different tasks. (iii) One may leverage the redundant links to increase the overall bandwidth between (copies of) nodes, at the expense of reliability. (iv) The above operations can be applied locally; e.g., in a congested region of the network, the link redundancy could be used for additional bandwidth. Note that if only a small part of the network is congested, the overall system reliability will not deteriorate significantly. Note that the above strategies can be refined and combined according to the profile of requirements of the system.

8 Conclusion

In this work we analyze simple replication strategies for improving network reliability. While our basic schemes may hardly surprise, to the best of our knowledge the literature does not provide the kind of discussion given here. This, in turn, surprised us: simplicity is an important design feature, and we tried to convey the message that a number of significant advantages in overall system design arise from the proposed approach. In addition, we highlight that (still simple) refined strategy results in near-optimal trade-offs under the constraint that arbitrary routing schemes are fully preserved. We consider this property highly useful in general and essential in real-time systems. Weaker guarantees may result in more efficient solutions, but also necessitate that other system levels must be able to handle the consequences.

Our work raises a number of follow-up questions. (i) Which network topologies allow for good partitions as utilized in Section 6? Small constants here result in highly efficient reinforcement schemes, which is key to practical solutions. (ii) Is it possible to guarantee strong simulations at smaller overheads? (iii) Can constructions akin to the one given in Section 6 be applied to a larger class of graphs?

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A Other Related Work

In the area of Fault-Tolerant Logical Network Structures, the goal is to compute a subnetwork that has a predefined property, e.g., containing minimum spanning tree. More specifically, the sub-network should sustain adversarial omission faults without losing the property. Hence, the sub-network is usually augmented (with edges) from the input network in comparison to its corresponding non-fault-tolerant counterpart. Naturally, an additional goal is to compute a small such sub-network. In contrast, we design a network that is reinforced (or augmented) by additional edges and nodes so that a given routing scheme can be simulated while facing randomized Byzantine faults. As we ask for being able to "reproduce" an arbitrary routing scheme (in the sense of a simulation relation), we cannot rely on a sub-network.

The literature also considered random fault models. In the network reliability problem, the goal is to compute the probability that the (connected) input network becomes disconnected under random independent edge failures. The reliability of a network is the probability that the network remains connected after this random process. Karger [Kar01] gave a fully polynomial randomized approximation scheme for the network reliability problem. Chechik et. al [CEPSP12] studied a variant of the task, in which the goal is to compute a sparse sub-network that approximates the reliability of the input network. We, on the other hand, construct a reinforced network that increases the reliability of the input network; note also that our requirements are much stricter than merely preserving connectivity. For a more detailed survey on Fault-Tolerant Logical Network Structures, see [P.16].

Compact self-healing routing schemes were studied by Castañeda et. al [CDT16]. In this context, the term "compact" means that each node's storage is limited to o(n). In the self-healing model, the adversary removes nodes in an online fashion, one node in each time step (at most n such steps). In turn, the distributed algorithm adds links and sends at most $O(\Delta)$ additional messages to overcome the inflicted omission fault. A nice property of this algorithm is that the degrees are increased by at most 3. For our purposes, an issue is that the diameter is increased by a logarithmic factor of the maximum initial degree, and hence the same holds for the latency of the routing scheme. Instead, we design a network that is "oblivious" to faults in the sense that the network is "ready" for independent random faults up to a certain probability, without the need to reroute messages or any other reconfiguration. Moreover, our reinforcements tolerate Byzantine faults and work for arbitrary routing schemes. We remark that compact self-healing routing schemes also deal with the update time of the local data structures following the deletion of a node; no such update is required in our approach.

Kuhn et. al [KSW10] study faults in peer-to-peer systems in which an adversary adds and removes nodes from the network within a short period of time (this process is also called churn). In this setting, the goal is to maintain functionality of the network in spite of this adversarial process. Kuhn et. al [KSW10] considered hypercube and pancake topologies, with a powerful adversary that cannot be "fooled" by randomness. However, it is limited to at most $O(\Delta)$ nodes which it can add or remove within any constant amount of time. The main idea in [KSW10] is to maintain a balanced partition of the nodes, where each part plays the role of a supernode in the network topology. This is done by rebalancing the nodes after several adversarial acts, and increasing the dimensionality of the hypercube in case the parts become too big. In section 6, we study hypercube networks as well as minor-free networks. We employ two partitioning techniques to make sure that: (1) the size of each part is constant and (2) the number of links in the cut between the parts is at most $\varepsilon \cdot n$, where n is the number of nodes. These partitioning techniques help us to dial down the overheads within each part, and to avoid a failure of each part due to its small size. However, we note that our motivation for considering these topologies is that they are used as communication topologies, for which we can provide good reinforcements, rather than choosing them to exploit their structure for constructing efficient and/or reliable routing schemes.

B Practical View on Other Performance Measures

We briefly discuss, from a practical point of view, why we do not explicitly consider further metrics that are of interest.

- Latency. As our reinforcements require (time-preserving) simulation relations, in terms of rounds, there is no increase in latency whatsoever. However, we note that (i) we require all copies of a node to have access to the input (i.e., routing requests) of the simulated node and (ii) our simulations require to map received messages in G' to received messages of the simulated node in G. Regarding (i), recall that it is beneficial to place all copies of a node in physical vicinity, implying that the induced additional latency is small. Moreover, our constructions naturally lend themselves to support redundancy in computations as well, by having each copy of a node perform the tasks of its original; in this case, (i) comes for free. Concerning (ii), we remark that the respective operations are extremely simple; implementing them directly in hardware is straightforward and will have limited impact on latency in most systems.
- Bandwidth/link capacities. We consider the uniform setting in this work. Taking into account how our simulations operate, one may use the ratio η as a proxy for this value.
- Energy consumption. Regarding the energy consumption of links, the same applies as for bandwidth. The energy nodes use for routing computations is the same as in the original system, except for the overhead induced by Point (ii) we discussed for latency. Neglecting the latter, the energy overhead is in the range $[\min\{\nu,\eta\},\max\{\nu,\eta\}]$.
- Hardware cost. Again, neglecting the computational overhead of the simulation, the relative overhead lies in the range $[\min\{\nu,\eta\},\max\{\nu,\eta\}]$

In light of these considerations, we focus on p, ν , and η as key metrics for evaluating the performance of our reinforcement strategies.

C Omitted Proofs

C.1 Proof of Lemma 5

Proof. We subdivide the node set into h-ary d-dimensional subcubes. There are $(q/h)^d$ such subcubes. The edges crossing the regions are those connecting the faces of adjacent subcubes. For each subcube, we attribute for each dimension one face to each subcube (the opposite face being accounted for by the adjacent subcube in that direction). Thus, we have at most dh^{d-1} crossing edges per subcube. The total number of edges per subcube are these crossing edges plus the $d(h-1)h^{d-1}$ edges within the subcube. Overall, the fraction of crossedges is thus at most 1/(1+(h-1))=1/h, as claimed (for an example of the subdivision of the node set of a 6-ary 2-dimensional hypercube into 2-ary 2-dimensional subcubes see Figure 1).

C.2 Proof of Lemma 9

Proof. Select for each $R_{k'}$, $k' \in [k]$, f + 1 indices i such that $\{v_i | v \in R_{k'}\} \cap F' = \emptyset$ and denote by C the union of all these nodes. We claim that each $v' \in C$ successfully

maintains a copy of the state of P(v') under A. We show this by induction on the round number $r \in \mathbb{N}$, anchored at r = 0 due to initialization.

For the step from r to r+1, observe that because all $v' \in C$ have a copy of the state of P(v') at the end of round r by the induction hypothesis, each of them can correctly determine the message P(v') would send over link $(v, w) \in E$ in round r+1 and send it over each $(v', w') \in E$ with P(w') = w. For each $v' \in C$ and each (w, P(v')), we distinguish two cases. If P(v') and w are in the same region, let i be such that $v' = v_i$. In this case, $N_{v'} = \{w_i\}$ and, by definition of C, $w_i \in C$. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, w_i sends the correct message in round r+1 over the link (w', v'). On the other hand, if P(v') and w are in different regions, $N_{v'}(w) = \{w_i \mid i \in [\ell]\}$. By the definition of C and the induction hypothesis, the majority of these nodes (i.e., at least f+1 of them) sends the correct message w would send over (w, P(v')) in round v' = 1 when executing v' = 1. We conclude that v' = 1 or correctly updates its state, completing the proof.