The joint board of appeal as an accountability mechanism for the ESAs
- Author
- Merijn Chamon (UGent)
- Organization
- Abstract
- This chapter explores the degree to which the Joint Board of Appeal fulfils its potential as a mechanism allowing parties such as investment firms to hold to account the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), and notably the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), when they are governed by MiFID II or MiFIR. Before focusing on the potential of the Board of Appeal as an accountability mechanism open to investment firms, the discussion will be contextualized by examining the problematic accountability regime in relation to the EU decentralized agencies in general. This is relevant because the ESAs are part of this larger group of bodies, and because the specific mechanism of the Board of Appeal is not unique to the ESAs, but is, instead, shared with several other decentralized agencies. This more general analysis shows that the emphasis of the EU decentralized agencies' (and the ESAs') accountability regimes are placed on a form of professional accountability, but that, specifically for the ESAs, this only results in a partial accountability, since no accountability relationship is defined for the ESAs’ Boards of Supervisors. This finding underlines the importance of being able to hold the Board of Supervisors accountable before the Joint Board of Appeal, even if the latter is not formally qualified as an accountability forum, in terms of the ESAs regulations.
- Keywords
- Joint Board of Appeal, investment firms, accountability, European Supervisory Authorities, European Securities and Markets Authority, MiFID II, MiFIR, EU decentralized agencies, Board of Supervisors, ESA regulations
Citation
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication: http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-8770596
- MLA
- Chamon, Merijn. “The Joint Board of Appeal as an Accountability Mechanism for the ESAs.” Legal Accountability in EU Markets for Financial Instruments : The Dual Role of Investment Firms, edited by Carl Fredrik Bergström and Magnus Strand, Oxford University Press, 2022, pp. 55–78, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192849281.003.0003.
- APA
- Chamon, M. (2022). The joint board of appeal as an accountability mechanism for the ESAs. In C. F. Bergström & M. Strand (Eds.), Legal accountability in EU markets for financial instruments : the dual role of investment firms (pp. 55–78). https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192849281.003.0003
- Chicago author-date
- Chamon, Merijn. 2022. “The Joint Board of Appeal as an Accountability Mechanism for the ESAs.” In Legal Accountability in EU Markets for Financial Instruments : The Dual Role of Investment Firms, edited by Carl Fredrik Bergström and Magnus Strand, 55–78. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192849281.003.0003.
- Chicago author-date (all authors)
- Chamon, Merijn. 2022. “The Joint Board of Appeal as an Accountability Mechanism for the ESAs.” In Legal Accountability in EU Markets for Financial Instruments : The Dual Role of Investment Firms, ed by. Carl Fredrik Bergström and Magnus Strand, 55–78. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780192849281.003.0003.
- Vancouver
- 1.Chamon M. The joint board of appeal as an accountability mechanism for the ESAs. In: Bergström CF, Strand M, editors. Legal accountability in EU markets for financial instruments : the dual role of investment firms. Oxford University Press; 2022. p. 55–78.
- IEEE
- [1]M. Chamon, “The joint board of appeal as an accountability mechanism for the ESAs,” in Legal accountability in EU markets for financial instruments : the dual role of investment firms, C. F. Bergström and M. Strand, Eds. Oxford University Press, 2022, pp. 55–78.
@incollection{8770596,
abstract = {{This chapter explores the degree to which the Joint Board of Appeal fulfils its potential as a mechanism allowing parties such as investment firms to hold to account the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), and notably the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), when they are governed by MiFID II or MiFIR. Before focusing on the potential of the Board of Appeal as an accountability mechanism open to investment firms, the discussion will be contextualized by examining the problematic accountability regime in relation to the EU decentralized agencies in general. This is relevant because the ESAs are part of this larger group of bodies, and because the specific mechanism of the Board of Appeal is not unique to the ESAs, but is, instead, shared with several other decentralized agencies. This more general analysis shows that the emphasis of the EU decentralized agencies' (and the ESAs') accountability regimes are placed on a form of professional accountability, but that, specifically for the ESAs, this only results in a partial accountability, since no accountability relationship is defined for the ESAs’ Boards of Supervisors. This finding underlines the importance of being able to hold the Board of Supervisors accountable before the Joint Board of Appeal, even if the latter is not formally qualified as an accountability forum, in terms of the ESAs regulations.}},
author = {{Chamon, Merijn}},
booktitle = {{Legal accountability in EU markets for financial instruments : the dual role of investment firms}},
editor = {{Bergström, Carl Fredrik and Strand, Magnus}},
isbn = {{9780192849281}},
keywords = {{Joint Board of Appeal,investment firms,accountability,European Supervisory Authorities,European Securities and Markets Authority,MiFID II,MiFIR,EU decentralized agencies,Board of Supervisors,ESA regulations}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{55--78}},
publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
title = {{The joint board of appeal as an accountability mechanism for the ESAs}},
url = {{http://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192849281.003.0003}},
year = {{2022}},
}
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