Intimacy at a distance: A history of United States-Singapore foreign relations from 1965 to 1975

Abstract

Singapore became an independent state on 9 August 1965, six months after United States forces landed in Vietnam in March 1965. As part of an effort to contain the influence of the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China in Southeast Asia, Washington deployed a strategy that encompassed political, economic and defence engagements with non-communist countries in the region. Because of its strategic location and significant population of overseas Chinese, Singapore became a key country in Washington’s policy towards Southeast Asia. Between 1965 and 1975, Washington aimed to maintain its access to Singapore’s naval dockyards and to keep the island state’s economy viable, so as to limit the risk of communist subversion in Singapore. The Singapore government’s objectives were to preserve its legitimacy to govern by developing Singapore’s economy and boosting its security during the Cold War. In order to gain international recognition of its independence after separation from Malaysia, the Singapore government decided to join the Non-aligned Movement and maintained an image of neutralism in the bipolar conflict between the US and the USSR. After a rocky start in the US-Singapore relationship in late 1965, America’s relations with Singapore improved in 1966. Nevertheless, the Singapore government seemed to distance itself from the US while drawing nearer to the Soviet Union between the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Drawing from archival documents from the United States, Britain and Australia, this dissertation presents a history of US-Singapore foreign relations during the period of the Vietnam War, and argues that relations between the two countries were determined by the interplay of America’s policy of containment and Singapore’s attempt at projecting a non-aligned foreign policy stance. Although the first decade of Singapore’s independence established the United States as an indispensable contributor to Singapore’s economic growth and security during the Cold War, the process was not always smooth because the leaders in both countries recognised that their interests were best met when Singapore and the US maintained political distance from each other. This study adds to a current trend in Cold War historiography in Southeast Asia by demonstrating how American strategy was influenced by smaller states such as Singapore. The Singapore government attempted to sway US strategy in the region and was able to achieve its goals when it played the Soviet card. Non-communist Southeast Asian leaders, including Lee Kuan Yew, exerted pressure on the US government to maintain troops in Vietnam and prolonged the Vietnam war. This study establishes a link between a prosperous Southeast Asia and a Vietnam that became a war zone and proposes that Singapore was able to prosper not only due to good governance, but also because of America’s interest in keeping Singapore economically viable.