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Strategic stability of equilibria: the missing paragraph

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De Stefano Grigis, Federico [UCL]

This paper introduces two set valued Nash equilibrium refinements that are a natural generalization of the concept of stable set of equilibria introduced in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and satisfy all the properties defined in Mertens (1989). It also establishes a connection between Nash equilibrium refinements and stochastic games as a tool to define a stable set of equilibria.

Document type Document de travail (Working Paper)
Access type Accès libre
Publication date 2014
Language Anglais
Affiliation UCL - SSH/LIDAM/CORE - Center for operations research and econometrics
Keywords game theory ; equilibrium refinements ; strategic stability ; stochastic games
Links
Bibliographic reference De Stefano Grigis, Federico. Strategic stability of equilibria: the missing paragraph. (2014)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/143970