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Tax evasion and social information: an experiment in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands

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Lefebvre, Mathieu [UCL] Pestieau, Pierre [Université de Liège] Riedl, Arno Villeval, Marie Claire

We experimentally study how receiving information about tax compliance of others affects individuals’ occupational choices and subsequent evading decisions. In one treatment individuals receive information about the highest tax evasion rates of others in past experimental sessions with no such social information; in another treatment they receive information about the lowest tax evasion rates observed in the past sessions with no such social information. We observe an asymmetric effect of social information on tax compliance. Whereas examples of high compliance do not have any disciplining effect, we find evidence that examples of low compliance significantly increase tax evasion for certain audit probabilities. No major differences are found across countries.

Document type Article de périodique (Journal article)
Access type Accès interdit
Publication date 2014
Language Anglais
Journal information "International Tax and Public Finance" - Vol. 22, no.3, p. 401-425 (2014)
Peer reviewed yes
Publisher Springer New York LLC (New York)
issn 0927-5940
e-issn 1573-6970
Publication status Publié
Affiliation UCL - SSH/LIDAM/CORE - Center for operations research and econometrics
Keywords Tax evasion ; Social interactions ; Peer effects ; Cross-country comparisons ; Experiments
Links
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Bibliographic reference Lefebvre, Mathieu ; Pestieau, Pierre ; Riedl, Arno ; Villeval, Marie Claire. Tax evasion and social information: an experiment in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands. In: International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 22, no.3, p. 401-425 (2014)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/158667