Majority support for progressive income taxation with corner preferences

This paper studies voting over quadratic taxation when income is fixed and taxation non distortionary. The set of feasible taxes is compact and self-interested voters have corner preferences. We first show that, if a majority winning tax policy exists, it involves maximum progressivity. We then give a necessary and suficient condition on the income distribution for a majority winner to exist. This condition appears to be satisfied for a large class of distribution functions.

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Document type	Article de périodique (Journal article)
Access type	Accès restreint
Publication date	2004
Language	Anglais
Journal information	"Public Choice" - Vol. 118, no. 3-4, p. 437-449 (Mars 2004)
Peer reviewed	yes
Publisher	Springer New York LLC (New York, USA)
issn	0048-5829
Publication status	Publié
Affiliations	Universite de Toulouse - IDEI and GREMAQ UCL - EUEN/CORE - Center for operations research and econometrics
Keywords	Majority Voting ; Income Taxation ; Tax Progressivity
Links	https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PUCH.0000019907.16784.cb[DOI] http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/23440[Handle]

See also
	[boreal:4885]	Majority support for progressive income taxation with corner preferences