Petit, Christophe
[UCL]
Standaert, François-Xavier
[UCL]
Pereira, Olivier
[UCL]
Malkin, T.G.
[Columbia university]
Yung, M.
[Columbia University]
We study the security of a block cipher-based pseudorandom
number generator (PRNG), both in the black box world and
in the physical world, separately. We first show that the
construction is a secure PRNG in the ideal cipher model.
Then, we demonstrate its security against a Bayesian side-
channel key recovery adversary. As a main result, we show
that our construction guarantees that the success rate of the
adversary does not increase with the number of physical observations, but in a limited and controlled way. Besides, we
observe that, under common assumptions on side-channel
attack strategies, increasing the security parameter (typically the block cipher key size) by a polynomial factor involves an increase of a side-channel attack complexity by
an exponential factor, making the probability of a successful attack negligible. We believe this work provides a first
interesting example of the way the algorithmic design of a
cryptographic scheme in°uences its side-channel resistance.
Bibliographic reference |
Petit, Christophe ; Standaert, François-Xavier ; Pereira, Olivier ; Malkin, T.G. ; Yung, M.. A Block Cipher based Pseudo Random Number Generator Secure Against Side-Channel Key Recovery.ASIACCS 2008 (Tokyo (Japan), du 18/03/2008 au 20/03/2008). In: Proceedings of ASIACCS 2008, 2008 |
Permanent URL |
http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/81796 |