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The timing of contests

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Grandjean, Gilles J. [FUSL] Sekeris, Petros G.

We develop a simple model to analyze the timing of contests. When the odds of winning a contest are exogenously given – we show that if either the players discount the future or if the total cost of contest is smaller in the future – there exist subgame perfect equilibria where both players settle, anticipating a contest in the future. With endogenous efforts, the aggregate efforts expanded in a contest are smaller if the contest occurs in the future when the relative effort productivities remain constant or diverge over time, thus creating scope for delay in contests. When the effort productivities converge over time, the total efforts may be greater under a future contest. As a consequence, players either settle over the two periods, or else they initiate a contest immediately.

Document type Article de périodique (Journal article) – Article de recherche
Access type Accès libre
Publication date 2015
Language Anglais
Journal information "Defence and Peace Economics" - Vol. online, no.online, p. 1-13 (2015)
Peer reviewed yes
Publisher Routledge (Abingdon)
issn 1024-2694
e-issn 1476-8267
Affiliations USL-B - Autre
UCL - Autre
USL-B - Centre de recherche en Economie (CEREC)
Links
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Bibliographic reference Grandjean, Gilles J. ; Sekeris, Petros G.. The timing of contests. In: Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. online, no.online, p. 1-13 (2015)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.3/166712