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Investment in public infrastructures and tax competition between contiguous regions

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Dembour, Carole Wauthy, Xavier [UCL]

Two contiguous regions compete to attract a population of heterogeneous firms. They choose infrastructure levels in a first stage, then compete in tax. We compare the properties of subgame perfect nash equilibria in this stage-game depending on the intrisic features of the infrastructure considered. Then we derive some implications regarding the scope for cooperation between the regions.

Document type Document de travail (Working Paper)
Access type Accès libre
Publication date 2003
Collection ECON Discussion Papers - 2003/04, CEREC Working Papers - 2003/3
Affiliation USL-B - CEREC - Center for Research in Economics
Links
Bibliographic reference Dembour, Carole ; Wauthy, Xavier. Investment in public infrastructures and tax competition between contiguous regions. ECON Discussion Papers ; 2003/04 (2003)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.3/6023