English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONS
  This item is discarded!DetailsSummary

Discarded

Paper

Incomplete-Information Games in Large Populations with Anonymity

MPS-Authors
/persons/resource/persons183129

Hellwig,  Martin F.
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

External Resource

(No access)

Fulltext (restricted access)
There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.
Fulltext (public)
There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe
Supplementary Material (public)
There is no public supplementary material available
Citation

Hellwig, M. F. (2019). Incomplete-Information Games in Large Populations with Anonymity.


Abstract
The paper provides mathematical foundations for modelling strategic interdependence with a continuum of agents where uncertainty has an aggregate component and an agent-specific component and the latter satis.es a conditional law of large numbers. This decomposition of uncertainty is implied by a condition of anonymity in beliefs, under which the agent in question considers the other agents. types to be essentially pairwise exchangeable. If there is also anonymity in payoff functions, all strategically relevant aspects of beliefs are contained in an agent’s macro beliefs about the cross-section distribution of the other agents’ types. The paper also gives conditions under which a function assigning macro beliefs to types is compatible with the existence of a common prior.