Book/Report

FZJ-2018-04470

http://join2-wiki.gsi.de/foswiki/pub/Main/Artwork/join2_logo100x88.png Entscheidungsfehler des Betriebspersonals von Kernkraftwerken als Objekt probabilistischer Risikoanalysen: methodische Erweiterungen auf der Basis einer differenzierten Betrachtungsweise sicherheitsgerichteter Ziele

Reer, B. (Corresponding author)FZJ*

1993
Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH Zentralbibliothek, Verlag Jülich

Please use a persistent id in citations: http://hdl.handle.net/2128/19465

Report No.: Juel-2811

Abstract: The Integration of human error - also called man-machine system analysis (MMSA) - is an essential part of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). The current research inthis field emphasizes intentional errors in decision-making: the operator thinks the intended wrong action to be correct. Such errors will result in extraneous acts which reduce system safety directly or indirectly (with an increased probability). Conflicting goals between action alternatives or similiarities between system states are the main factors in causation of decision-based errors. Conflicts will entail errors due to individual risk acceptance. Similiarities will entail expectation errors yieldingincorrect system state identifications. Here a new method is presented which allows for a systematic and comprehensive PRA inclusions of decision-based errors due to conflicts or similiarities. For the error identification procedure, new question techniques are developed. These errors are shown to be identified by looking at retroactions caused by subordinate goals as components of the overall safety relevant goal. New quantification methods for estimating situation-specific probabilities are developed. The factors conflict and similiarity are operationalized in a way that allows their quantification based an informations which are usually availabie in PRA. The quantification procedure uses extrapolations and interpolations based an a poor set of data related to decision-based errors. Moreover, for passive errors in decisionmaking a compietely new approach is presented where errors are quantified via a delay initiating the required action rather than via error probabilities. Thepracticability of this dynamic approach is demonstrated by a probabilistic analysis of the actions required during the total loss of feedwater event at the Davis-Besse plant 1985. The extensions of the "classical" PRA method developed in this work are applied to a MMSA of the decay heat removal (DHR) of the medium sized high-temperature concept "HTR-500". Errors in decision-making - as potential roots of extraneous acts - are taken into account in a comprehensive and systematic manner. Five additional errors are identified. However, the probabilistic quantification results a nonsignificant increase of the DHR failure probability. The conciusions of the presented work concern improvements of system safety and PRA validity. Activities to decrease individual risk acceptance will improve system safety; some ideas are given. An improved validity in quantifying risk acceptance can be reached by refinements of expert judgement models (e. g. SLIM) and by application of time-dependent models.

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Contributing Institute(s):

1. Publikationen vor 2000 (PRE-2000)

Research Program(s):

1. 899 - ohne Topic (POF3-899) (POF3-899)

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Database coverage:

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