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| Book/Report | FZJ-2019-04547 |
; ;
1998
Forschungszentrum Jülich, Zentralbibliothek, Verlag
Jülich
Please use a persistent id in citations: http://hdl.handle.net/2128/22643
Report No.: Juel-3603
Abstract: Verification of compliance to formal agreements requires the performance of inspections for detection of illegal behavior. If the inspections are carried out in such a way that the gain the inspectee may expect from illegal behavior is smaller than for behaving legally, then the inspections may be said to have deterred him from violation. Achieving deterrence is assumed to be the prirnary objective of the verification regime. In this paper inspection problems characterized additionally by a 'critical time' are considered svstematically for the first time. The critical time is the maximum time interval within which illegal activity must be detected in order to meet the objectives of the agreement. Such critically time-dependent inspection problems are modeled here as two-personnon-cooperative games between inspector ancl inspectee. Theo- extend over a reference time interval in which the inspector performs 7 inspections and in which the inspectee behaves iliegally at most once. The inspections may or may not lead to statistical errors of the first and second kind and the inspectee may or may not be in a position to take advantage of information gained during the reference time interval. Equilibria are investigated and conditions for the existente of deterring inspection strategies are determined.
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