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Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited : The Role of Private Strategies
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2531
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2531f102b358-1b1b-401d-b2e2-a7e9f2d2845b
| Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2013-06-03 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited : The Role of Private Strategies | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Efficiency | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Imperfect Public Monitoring | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Mixed Strategy | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Partnership Game | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Private Equilibrium | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Private Strategy | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Repeated Games | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Two-State Machine | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
| タイプ | technical report | |||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||
| アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
| 著者 |
Kandori, Michihiro
× Kandori, Michihiro× Obara, Ichiro |
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| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | University of Tokyo | |||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | UCLA | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | Most theoretical or applied research on repeated games with imperfect monitoring has restricted attention to public strategies; strategies that only depend on history of publicly observable signals, and perfect public equilibrium (PPE); sequential equilibrium in public strategies. The present paper sheds light on the role of private strategies; strategies that depend on players'own actions in the past as well as observed public signals. Our main finding is that players can sometimes make better use of information by using private strategies and efficiency in repeated games can often be drastically improved. We illustrate this for both games with a small signal space (Anti-folk theorem example) and games with a large signal space, for which the Folk Theorem holds. Our private strategy can be regarded as a machine which consists of two states. We provide two di erent characterizations of our two-state machine equilibrium for general two-person repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
| 書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 2003-CF-255, 発行日 2003-12 |
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| 書誌レコードID | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
| フォーマット | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
| 日本十進分類法 | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
| 主題 | 330 | |||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
| 出版者別名 | ||||||
| Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
| 関係URI | ||||||
| 識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
| 関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2003/2003cf255ab.html | |||||
