Abstract:
Based on prior research, this thesis develops new measures of corporate governance quality of independent compensation committees of U.S. listed companies. The thesis mainly consists of three essays. Essay One investigates the relations between compensation committee governance quality and firm characteristics. I find some evidence that compensation committee governance quality is lower for firms with high CEO influence, high growth opportunities, or high institutional holdings. I also find that compensation committee governance quality is significantly associated with firm size. Essay Two examines whether compensation committee governance quality affects the role of accounting earnings in CEO cash compensation. I find some evidence that CEO cash compensation is more positively associated with accounting earnings for firms with high compensation committee governance quality than for firms with low compensation committee governance quality. Essay Three investigates the effect of compensation committee governance quality on the performance consequences of CEO stock option grants. I document strong evidence that future earnings performance is more positively associated with CEO stock option grants for firms with high compensation committee governance quality than for firms with low compensation committee governance quality.