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A theory of esteem based peer pressure
journal contribution
posted on 2019-04-29, 10:58 authored by Fabrizio Adriani, Silvia SondereggerHow does the incentive to engage in social signaling depend on the composition of peers? We find that an increase in the mean peer quality may either strengthen signaling incentives (keeping up with the Joneses) or weaken them (small fish in a big pond). Both right and left truncations of the distribution of peer quality reduce signaling incentives, while more dispersed peer distributions strengthen them. Finally, more right skewed peer distributions strengthen signaling incentives when only a small fraction of the group engage in signaling, but weaken them when signaling is widespread.
History
Citation
Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, 115, pp. 314-335Author affiliation
/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, ARTS AND HUMANITIES/School of BusinessVersion
- AM (Accepted Manuscript)