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タイトル: Technological Competition, Cumulative Innovation, and Technological Development Schemes
著者: Ambashi, Masahito
キーワード: technological competition
cumulative innovation
technological development scheme
grant-back clause
L24
O32
O34
発行日: Aug-2021
出版者: Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University
誌名: KIER Discussion Paper
巻: 1065
開始ページ: 1
終了ページ: 26
抄録: This study investigates which technological development schemes are most desirable for technological competition and cumulative innovation, including follow-on innovation, under uncertainty conditions. Technological competition is likely to generate a social overincentive for innovations; it does so for follow-on innovation, especially when the consumer surplus is negligible. This study determines that a contract with a grant-back clause combined with an appropriate profit distribution mitigates social overinvestment in both initial and follow-on innovation; and therefore, improves social welfare. Moreover, this study demonstrates that if a government can specify a particular profit distribution between firms, the socially optimal investment in initial innovation can be realized. Conversely, assuming a significantly positive consumer surplus instead, this study reveals that competition in follow-on innovation creates a higher level of social welfare.
記述: Revised: September 2021
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2433/269658
関連リンク: https://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/publication/?cat=en
出現コレクション:KIER Discussion Paper (英文版)

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