Pragmatism as the philosophical foundation for the Joanna Briggs meta-aggregative approach to qualitative evidence synthesis

Abstract

<h4>Aim</h4>This paper presents a discussion of the role of the philosophy of pragmatism in the Joanna Briggs meta-aggregative approach to qualitative evidence synthesis.<h4>Background</h4>An increasing number of qualitative evidence syntheses are being published in journals, many of them influenced by an interpretive or a critical-realist perspective. One approach to qualitative evidence synthesis is meta-aggregation. Originally designed to model the transparency, auditability and reliability of the established process for effectiveness reviews, meta-aggregation makes a case for the production of synthesized statements that refer to 'lines of action' informing decision-making at the clinical or policy level.<h4>Data sources</h4>This paper draws from the literature written on the philosophy of pragmatism (1877-2008) and from the user guidance on meta-aggregation developed by the Joanna Briggs Institute between 2004 and 2007.<h4>Discussion</h4>Meta-aggregation as a methodology is founded on the principles and assumptions of the philosophical traditions of pragmatism. Meta-aggregation can only reach its full potential if the 'lines of action' suggested will somehow be supported by measures of effectiveness, as demonstrated in mixed method research.<h4>Implications for nursing</h4>The 'lines of action' presented as the result of a meta-aggregative synthesis are directive in nature and inform healthcare practitioners at the point of practical decision-making.<h4>Conclusion</h4>The real verification of the 'lines of action' suggested in a meta-aggregation consists of the satisfactorily ending consequences, mental or physical, which the synthesized statements that summarize the basic ideas emerging from the studies are able to generate in end users.