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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116655
Title: | Fiscal federalism and electoral accountability |
Author: | Aidt, Toke Dutta, Jayasri |
Keywords: | Federalisme Dret fiscal Béns públics Eleccions Federalism Tax law Public goods Elections |
Issue Date: | 2010 |
Publisher: | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona |
Series/Report no: | [WP E-IEB10/11] |
Abstract: | We study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive and negative externalities and show that centralization may not be efficient in economies with positive externalities even when regions are identical and centralization does not entail a loss of accountability. We also show that decentralization can only Pareto dominate centralization in economies with negative externalities. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions |
It is part of: | IEB Working Paper 2010/11 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116655 |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IEB10-11_Aidt+Dutta.pdf | 775.48 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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