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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/121338
Title: | Popularity shocks and political selection |
Author: | Cavalcanti, Francisco Daniele, Gianmarco Galletta, Sergio |
Keywords: | Partits polítics Corrupció política Political parties Political corruption |
Issue Date: | 2018 |
Publisher: | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona |
Series/Report no: | [WP E-IEB18/04] |
Abstract: | We observe that popularity shocks are crucial for electoral accountability beyond their effects on voters’ behaviors. By focusing on Brazilian politics, we show that the disclosure of audit reports on the (mis)use of federal funds by local administrators affects the type of candidates who stand for election. When the audit finds low levels of corruption, the parties supporting the incumbent select less-educated candidates. On the contrary, parties pick more-educated candidates when the audit reveals a high level of corruption. These effects are stronger in municipalities that have easier access to local media. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions |
It is part of: | IEB Working Paper 2018/04 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/121338 |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IEB18-04_Cavalcanti+Daniele+Galletta.pdf | 1.12 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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