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The political economy of economic regionalism in northeast asia: A unique and dynamic pattern

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Abstract

Since the mid-1980s there has been a gradual but steady rise of economic regionalism in Northeast Asia. However, the economic regionalism in Northeast Asia reveals its own dynamics and is presented in a form that is different from those in Western Europe and North America. Characterized by a “flying geese pattern” that has been developing in the region over time, the regionalism is soft and open; that is, it is uninstitutionalized and less discriminatory against other economies. This ongoing regionalism in Northeast Asia will inevitably bring profound political and economic implications for the region and beyond.

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References

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  2. Geographically, Northeast Asia covers Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Russia's Far East, Mongolia, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. However, this article mainly deals with five major economies of importance to the subject, that is: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China.

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  40. The cooperation in the economic area through APEC will be most likely first to spill over to those other functional areas such as emigration, drug trafficking and environmental pollution, for the problems in these areas can be addressed effectively only through cooperative measures.

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Additional information

Kevin G. Cai earned a Ph.D. in political science at Queen's University in Canada in 1996 Currently he is teaching at Kyonggi University in South Korea. His major research interests include the political economy of economic regionalism in the world economy, the regionalism in the Asia-Pacific area, APEC, China's integration into the regional and global economy, and various political, economic and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. The author would like to thank Michael K. Hawes for his valuable comments on the early draft of this article.

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Cai, K.G. The political economy of economic regionalism in northeast asia: A unique and dynamic pattern. East Asia 17, 6–46 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-999-0009-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-999-0009-9

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