The aim of this thesis is to give with substantial securacy a record of monetary development in New Zealand during the first four years of the Labour Government’s period of office and to make some critical comments on the policy then pursued. As such, the thesis may be condemned on the grounds of over-simplification and superficiality, through trying to cover too wide a field with too much brevity. But, although the factual data is accessible to anyone who cares to delve into the official New Zealand statistics, and, although written expressions of opinion on New Zealand’s recent monetary problems have been legion, the effort of carefully selecting these facts and opinions and bringing them together into a coherent and impartial treatise may still be worthwhile.

No such original contribution is here attempted, but a clear statement of existing ideas, especially as regards the limitations of monetary policy, and the interpretation of official statistics in the light of these ideas, is of some topical importance in New Zealand. A short chapter on war-time monetary problems has been included; and, incidentally, this has clarified rather than confused the main theme – namely that non finality can be reached in monetary policy but that the latter must always be a tool for producing something further, for example, organisation for war. Not that this remark is very profound, but it represents an attitude which it has been considered worth emphasising with some vigour.