Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10356/99238
Title: | A theory of the demand for underwriting | Authors: | Kamiya, Shinichi Browne, Mark J. |
Keywords: | DRNTU::Business::Finance::Insurance policies | Issue Date: | 2012 | Source: | Browne, M. J., & Kamiya, S. (2012). A theory of the demand for underwriting. Journal of risk and insurance, 79(2), 335-349. | Series/Report no.: | Journal of risk and insurance | Abstract: | We examine the demand for underwriting and its effect on equilibrium in an insurance market in which insureds know their risk type, but insurers do not. Our analysis indicates that a set of policies including one that requires buyers to take an underwriting test can constitute a full coverage Nash equilibrium when perfect classification is possible. We also find that underwriting equilibria, in which low risks obtain greater coverage than they would without underwriting, widely exist in a Wilsonian market with nonmyopic insurers. Our findings provide a potential explanation for why empirical evidence on adverse selection is mixed. | URI: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/99238 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/17189 |
ISSN: | 0022-4367 | DOI: | 10.1111/j.1539-6975.2011.01436.x | Schools: | Nanyang Business School | Fulltext Permission: | none | Fulltext Availability: | No Fulltext |
Appears in Collections: | NBS Journal Articles |
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