1970년대 중반 미국의 대한정책과 서해5도 문제

Abstract

북방한계선 (NLL)을 둔 남북간 갈등은 북한이 NLL를 불법적으로 그은 선이라며 수많은 경비정을 월선시키기 시작한 1973년 말부터 시작되었다. 1973년 8월 남북대화가 중단된 지 얼마밖에 되지 않은 시점에서 일어난 이러한 북한의 도발은 당시 동아시아 내 냉전 긴장 완화 국면과 깊은 관계가 있었으며 특히 북한은 유엔사령부 해체와 평화협정 그리고 주한미군 철수 등 자국이 추진하고자 하는 문제를 더 빠르게 진행하도록 하기 위해 도발을 일으킨 것으로 보인다. 그러나 NLL주변에서 일어난 북한의 도발에 있어 한미간 대응이 차이를 보였다. 한국은 NLL이남 지역을 자국의 영해라며 정전협정의 위반이라고 보는 반면, 미국은 NLL이 국제법적 근거가 없는 선이기 때문에 군사정전위원회 등에서 북한의 NLL월선 사건을 정전협정 위반이라고 규정하지 않았던 것이다. 그리고 이러한 입장차이는 1970년대 중반 당시 여러 차례를 걸쳐 일어난 NLL주변의 사건에서뿐만 아니라 지금까지도 다소 지속된 것으로 보인다. 본 연구는 당시 다양한 미국의 문서를 이용하여 한미간 NLL을 둔 입장차이의 기원을 규명하고자 하였다. 미국은 NLL을 국제법적 근거가 없는 선이기 때문에 당시 유엔사령부가 국제법적으로 애매한 상황에 처하면 안 된다는 입장이었다. 뿐만 아니라 당시 유엔사령부가 유엔에서 그 해체 여부를 묻는 투표가 진행되고 있는 상황이었기 때문에 자칫하면 NLL 문제 등 국제법적으로 애매한 문제로 유엔사령부에 대한 국제 여론을 부정적으로 만듬으로써 유엔사령부의 종말을 불러일으킬 미국의 우려가 있었다. 따라서NLL문제가 발생한1973년 말부터 미국은 NLL주변의 사건에서 유엔사령부의 책임을 여러 조치로 줄이려 하였다. 그리고 이러한 미국의 태도는 1975년 사이공 함락 이후 한미간 안보 관계가 강화되었음에도 불구하고 지속되었다. 본 연구는 한미간 입장차이는 대체적으로 보았을 때 양국의 상반된 위상 차이 때문에 발생했다고 주장한다. 미국은 글로벌 헤게몬으로서 정책결정과정에서 수많은 세계적인 요소를 고려해야 한다. 당시 미 결정정책자들은 NLL지역에서 영해 문제 등 국제법적으로 애매하고 복잡한 이슈에 연루되는 것을 우려하였다. 반면, 남한의 정책결정과정은 북한과의 대립 상황만을 고려해서 진행되었다. 남한은 NLL을 북한의 서해5도 진입을 막기 위한 가장 유용한 방어도구라고 인식하고 NLL을 사수정책을 도입하였다.

키워드: 북방한계선, 한미관계, 정전협정, 유엔사령부, 서해5도

학번: 2010-22896

The US and South Korea have had a little-known disagreement over the Northern Limit Line (NLL) since the 1970s. While South Korea has viewed crossings over the line by North Korean patrol boats as violations of the Armistice Agreement, and indeed territorial infractions, the United States has defined violations of the Armistice Agreement as occurring only when North Korean boats cross into the three nautical mile contiguous waters of the Northwest Islands, which are located just south of the NLL. There has been little research done on the reasons for this disagreement, which first began in the mid-1970s when North Korea claimed that the Northwest Islands were inside its 12-mile contiguous waters and tried to invalidate the NLL. This research aims to analyze the reasons for this disagreement by examining US-South Korean relations during the Nixon and Ford administrations (1969-1976) and using newly unearthed US government documents on the NLL-issue from the period. Following the end of North-South dialogue in August 1973, tensions rose on the peninsula following North Korean claims in December that the waters surrounding the Northwest Islands fell into the contiguous waters claimed by North Korea. North Korean aims for this provocation seem likely to have been related to the ongoing discussions between the US and China over the resolution of the Korea Issue, which were aimed at terminating the United Nations Command. North Korea believed that the termination of the United Nations Command would lead to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the peninsula, and the eventual signing of a peace treaty that would replace the Armistice Agreement. From late 1973 to 1976, a series of incidents occurred in the Northwest Islands region, some serious, but many simply NLL crossings instigated by North Korean patrol boats. However, the US and South Korean responses to these incidents demonstrated their disagreement over what defined Armistice Agreement violations. During the Nixon administration (1969-1974) US and South Korean relations had undergone deep conflict. Coming off the heels of the late 1960s crisis, and most notably the different reactions among the two allies toward North Korean provocations, the troop withdrawals and policy of détente of the Nixon administration induced fears of a weakening US security commitment among South Korean leaders. This state of relations continued up until the fall of Indochina during the Ford administration, when US policymakers began worrying about the threat of a North Korean attack against the South and strengthened the security commitment toward the country. However, even during this period of improved relations between the two allies, US views on the Northern Limit Line did not change. South Korean leaders were motivated by security concerns and actively made it clear that North Korean ships crossing the NLL were violations of the Armistice Agreement and South Korean territorial waters. In incidents that occurred from 1974 to 1976, South Korean authorities called for Military Armistice Commission meetings over incidents where North Korean ships crossed the Northern Limit Line, and made public announcements that the crossings were infractions of South Korean territorial waters. Further, in light of the strategic significance of the region and the rising North Korean military presence there, South Korean leaders began fortifying the region and called on US direct intervention in case of conflict in the region. Largely speaking, South Korean leaders were focused on the security that the NLL provided and were unwilling to consider any other options. US policymakers were more concerned with maintaining the Armistice system put in place after the Korean War, and because the NLL was not part of this system, US policymakers did not recognize it. Particularly in a situation where the United Nations Command was under international scrutiny, US policymakers were eager to prevent the organization from being involved in territorial disputes that could damage its legitimacy and thus tried to minimize their involvement in the region. They tried to accomplish this by defining the contiguous waters of the Northwest Islands as three nautical miles and preventing South Korea from defining incidents occurring south of the NLL as violations of its territorial waters. Furthermore, US policymakers made efforts to minimize their involvement militarily in the region and denied any direct involvement of US troops in the region

however, following the strengthening of the security commitment toward South Korean following the fall of Indochina, the US made more of an effort to show that it was aware of South Korean security concerns over the region. This paper argues that the disagreement over the NLL issue between the US and South Korea were related to the respective global status of the two countries. The US, a global hegemon with interests across the world, has had to take many interests into account in its policymaking. US policymakers were concerned over becoming involved in potentially complex legal issues concerning territorial claims in the Northwest Islands region, and were particularly attuned to the international image of the United Nations Command. South Korea, in contrast, calculated its policy moves largely in relation to its position toward North Korea. In view of the security benefits that the NLL provided against North Korean encroachment in the Northwest Islands region, South Korean leaders decided on a policy of defending the line at all costs.

Keywords: Northern Limit Line, US-ROK Relations, Armistice Agreement, United Nations Command, Northwest Islands

Student Number: 2010-22896